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Abstract
European integration has increasingly come to depend on the abolition of national 
regulations,  driven  by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union  (ECJ). 
According to previous research, this mode of integration effectively undermines 
the institutional foundations of social democratic welfare states and coordinated 
systems of industrial relations – something which has not been fully appreciated 
by social  democratic parties in these countries. The purpose of the thesis is to 
explain  the  Swedish  Social  Democratic  Party's  (SAP)  response  to  these 
challenges.  Through  the  application  of  theories  from  the  literature  on 
Europeanization  and  welfare  state  retrenchment,  two  cases  are  analysed:  the 
liberalization  of  healthcare,  and the  controversial  interpretations  of  the  Posted 
Workers Directive.
In both cases the SAP identified the initial “misfit” caused by EU policies and 
mobilized to resist it. It was however only in the second case that the party came 
to the conclusion that changes to secondary law would not suffice and that Treaty 
change was necessary. This difference is explained by trade union mobilization, 
caused by threats to the institutional power bases of these actors. In Sweden, the 
social  partners  remain  highly  relevant  also  to  the  study  of  welfare  state 
retrenchment, as they did in its expansion phase.
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integration, Europeanization, EU
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1 Introduction
”They are enthusiastic because they are deluding themselves.”
They quote above was made by the political scientist Fritz W. Scharpf. It contains 
his  response  to  the  question  of  why  organized  labour,  in  the  form  of  social 
democratic parties and trade unions, continue to lend their support to a European 
project that according to Scharpf is working against their fundamental interests 
(Social Europe Journal, Autumn 2008: 16). Indeed, Scharpf is far from alone in 
claiming that the last twenty-five years of European integration has been primarily 
focused on liberalization and deregulation in many areas, while efforts to counter 
this development with some sort of “social dimension” have largely fallen flat. 
Others have claimed that this sustained support from centre-left parties can best be 
explained by pointing to how the EU provides them with a “capacity to retain 
their social democratic credentials, despite the absence of corresponding policy 
output” – in essence, as a tool for obfuscating political impotence at the national 
level (Bailey 2005: 18). I find these explanations crude and unsatisfactory. Either 
social democratic parties are viewed as not being able to actually grasp current 
events  and  realise  that  resistance  would  be  for  their  own good.  Or,  they  are 
described as purely office-seeking, rational actors who happily mislead voters by 
blaming  the  EU  to  hide  their  own  shortcomings.  Surely,  a  more  nuanced 
explanation can be found; one that takes stock of differences between policy areas 
and the specificities of national institutions, as well as the role of other domestic 
actors.
In the wake of his government's decision to apply for EC membership in 1990, 
then Swedish prime minister  Ingvar Carlsson stated his  belief  that  it  was still 
possible to pursue a distinct social democratic economic and social policy agenda 
– but only as long as it was done at the European level. It had by then become 
common knowledge that  the  room for  manoeuvre  for  a  small,  export-oriented 
country such as Sweden had been severely circumscribed. National discretion in 
the  field  of  economic  policy  had  been  fundamentally  altered  in  a  globalized 
economy  with  deregulated  capital  markets.  The  Swedish  Social  Democratic 
Party's (SAP) economic experiments during of 80's, the so called “Third way”, 
had ended in huge capital  outflows and a severe recession with unprecedented 
levels  of  unemployment.  The  SAP  subsequently  lost  office  to  a  centre-right 
coalition in 1991, but only after publicly announcing that Sweden would hold a 
referendum with a view to become a full member of the EC. Sweden's economic 
woes  undoubtedly  had  significant  impact  on  the  government's  sudden  policy 
change, as the decision to hold a referendum was presented as an explicit part of 
the austerity program adopted to deal with the crisis (Pontusson 1992: 323).
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Some  have  argued  that  the  Swedish  model,  that  had  been  the  envy  of 
progressives across the globe and was credited with producing one of the most 
affluent  and  equal  societies  in  the  world,  ceased  to  exist  with  the  90's  crisis 
(Brenner  and  Bundgaard  Vad  2000:  67).  Undoubtedly,  major  changes  to  the 
Swedish economy took place during those years and have continued to do so in 
the  years  that  have  followed  (Berg  and  Ö.  Erlingsson  2008:  74-76).  But  the 
fundamental characteristics of the welfare model seems nevertheless to be holding 
up quite well. Sweden still comes out remarkably close to the “ideal type” social-
democratic (or Scandinavian) welfare state, largely irrespective of the indicators 
used for  measurement  (Arts  and Gelissen 2002;  Kammer,  Niehues  and Peichl 
2012; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011).
Equally eye-catching is  the outstanding popular  support the comprehensive 
welfare state continues to enjoy.  If anything,  the view that social  services and 
transfers should be publicly financed has actually become slightly more common 
in recent years. As has the willingness to pay for this via taxes (Svallfors 2011). 
The Swedish welfare state can even be said to form an integral part of the national 
identity.  It  has  throughout  modern  Swedish  history  served  as  a  “mobilizing 
image” (Ryner 2007: 64), seized upon by actors across the political spectrum to 
justify policies and render them appropriate to the public. During the campaign 
leading up to the membership referendum of 1994, the ability to preserve, expand, 
or even export the Swedish welfare model was invoked by actors on both sides of 
the vote (Aylott  1999: 70).  The lasting importance  of the model  as a tool  for 
framing  and  rendering  policy  legitimate  in  Swedish  politics  can  thus  be 
established. As can the fact that it played a significant role in the early years of 
EU membership, when many (but certainly not all) actors seemed quite optimistic 
regarding  the  compatibility  of  the  Swedish  welfare  state  with  the  prospects 
offered by European integration.
The  consequences  of  the  current  trajectory  of  European  integration  for 
national welfare states are disputed and often hard to assess. Researchers differ in 
their  judgements  as  to  whether  the  EU  undermines,  complements  or  even 
enhances different national models. This is in a way to be expected. One's point of 
view is necessarily influenced by a number of factors, such as how one chooses to 
define  the characteristics  of national  welfare  models.  Or by which criteria  are 
employed to evaluate the development of supranational social policies (Falkner 
2009: 13). Still, most research done in the field seem to indicate two, and to a 
somewhat  lesser degree three,  things. First,  that there still  have been very few 
significant advancements in the area of common social policy in the EU. Some 
explain  this  by  pointing  to  structural  factors  while  others  take  a  more  actor-
centered approach. Second, that many aspects of European integration since the 
late 80's has posed serious challenges to national welfare states, and that this is 
true even when accounting for pressures emanating from globalization in a more 
general sense. Third and last,  in addition to the second point,  some argue that 
these challenges are most severely felt by the social-democratic and conservative 
families of welfare states, and less so by the liberal.
The purpose of this thesis is not to assess the viability of the social democratic 
welfare state in a globalized economy. Nor is it to examine which factors are to 
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blame for the failure of a true “Social Europe” to emerge. Rather, the intention is 
to analyse how the SAP has reacted when faced with external pressure to change 
in issues that, according to the research mentioned above, should run counter to 
many of the fundamental values of the Swedish model. Which challenges to the 
Swedish model, emanating from the process of European integration, have given 
rise to political mobilization and resistance from the SAP and which have have 
not? How can this be explained?
In Europeanization  research,  it  is  commonly  held  that  some sort  of  misfit 
between  the  national  and  European  level  concerning  either  policy,  politics  or 
polity  is  a  precondition  for  transformative  pressure  to  materialize  (Börzel  and 
Risse 2000: 3-5). This is not disputed in the thesis. I do however stress that misfit  
has to be conceptualized in different ways to give an accurate picture. In short, 
ideas matter just as much as material factors for actor's preference formation and 
actions.  Misfit  is,  to  no  small  extent,  discursively  constructed  (Schmidt  and 
Radaelli  2006:  187).  All  actors  involved  are  forced  to  adhere  to  a  “logic  of 
appropriateness” when formulating their responses (March and Olsen 2004). This 
is perhaps never more true than in issues related to the welfare state, since “the 
welfare  state  itself  […]  could  not  exist  without  the  support  of  normative 
arguments and moral convictions” (Schmidt 2000: 230). And it is certainly the 
case in Sweden, where the welfare state forms such an indispensable part of the 
national identity. 
The  case  put  forward  by  those  arguing  that  the  EU  is  undermining  the 
institutional (and, as a consequence, normative) foundations of national welfare 
states  is  that  the  misfit  now  emerging  is  more  systemic  in  nature.  The 
consequences for some member states will not just be a cosmetic trimming of 
expenditure  levels  of  certain  public  schemes.  For  Sweden,  which has  seen its 
reformed welfare model once again become the subject of international attention 
and,  to  some  extent,  admiration,  this  would  risk  eliminating  the  comparative 
advantages which has formed the basis for its success in the globalized economy 
(Kleinman 2002: 77; Scharpf 2009: 27). This makes it necessary to distinguish 
between “policy retrenchment” and “institutional retrenchment”, where the latter 
is  what  is  at  stake  in  the  cases  studied  (Elmerud-Præstekær's  and  Baggesen 
Klitgaard 2012).  In order to capture these more  profound developments  I  will 
draw  on  the  work  of  Gøsta  Esping-Andersen.  His  use  of  the  concepts  of 
decommodification and stratification help explain the sociological underpinnings 
of different welfare “regimes” and how these might be affected by institutional 
retrenchment.
The analysis will be conducted through the examination of two cases, both of 
them  rather  recent  policy  developments  at  the  EU  level  which  according  to 
academic  research  each  ought  to  cause  tensions  when  confronted  with  the 
Swedish model. These are: 
1. The controversies concerning the so called Posted Workers Directive (96/71/EC), 
including the judgements of the ECJ in the Viking and Laval cases.
2. The efforts to create a European market for healthcare, including the negotiations 
regarding the Services Directive (2006/123/EC).
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1.1 Disposition
The thesis is structured as follows. In the first chapter, the characteristics of the 
Swedish  model  are  described  through  the  application  of  Esping-Andersen's 
concepts of decommodification and stratification. Both the welfare state and the 
system  of  industrial  relations  will  be  addressed.  Chapter  3  deals  with  the 
challenges posed by European integration to national institutions and policies; a 
brief  history  will  be  given  of  relevant  developments  in  ECJ  case  law,  before 
attention is turned to the concept of “negative integration” as described by Fritz 
W.  Scharpf.  The  next  chapter,  which  is  the  fourth,  will  discuss  some  of  the 
potential  factors  identified  by  Europeanization  and  welfare  state  retrenchment 
literature as  potentially having an impact on actions of the SAP. A theoretical 
framework is proposed. This framework guides the two case studies conducted in 
chapter 5, before the results from the analysis, and a short summary, concludes the 
study in chapter 6.
1.2 Abbreviations
Abbreviations will be explained throughout the text, but some occur more often 
and will hence be spelled out here as well. The Swedish Social Democratic Party 
is  referred to  as either  “the SAP” or  “the party”.  The Court  of  Justice  of the 
European Union is referred to as either “the ECJ” or “the Court”. “Europe” and 
“the EU” are used interchangeably. 
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2 Characteristics of the Swedish model
In the following chapter the main characteristics of the Swedish model will be 
described and its underlying mechanisms explained. The purpose is to provide a 
solid basis of knowledge before launching into the the more specific arguments 
put forward in chapter 3 and in the empirical analysis. I will in the following in 
one way apply a rather broad definition of what is to be included in the Swedish 
model. This is necessary for the purpose of the thesis, since the criticism put forth 
by Scharpf and others is that European integration poses threats to the institutional 
foundations of the model as such, rather than merely chipping away at the edges. 
This necessitates a theory that is focused on systemic, macro-level changes. It also 
leads to a definition that includes  both aspects of the welfare state  and of the 
national  system  of  industrial  relations.  These  institutions  form  an  symbiotic 
relationship in all modern  capitalist societies, and in Sweden even more so than 
usual.
But  this  definition  also  means  that  some  aspects  which  are  more  or  less 
commonly included in the concept of the Swedish model will not be dealt with. 
Among these can be noted the long tradition of high levels of female employment 
(Esping-Andersen  1999),  or  a  general  political  culture  of  pragmatism  and 
incrementalism (“the  Swedish  consensus”)(Berg  and  O.  Erlingsson  2008:  84). 
They are excluded because they do not clearly link to the mechanisms described 
below, and are hence not thought to be so fundamentally affected by those aspects 
of European integration dealt with in this thesis.     
2.1 The welfare state
Ever since Gösta Esping-Andersen's seminal work on welfare regimes, ”The three 
worlds of welfare capitalism”,  was published in 1990, welfare state typologies 
have been a matter of great academic interest and debate. Some have critized the 
scientific  usefulness  of  Esping-Andersen's  ideal  types,  and  from  a  feminist 
perspective  it  has  been  pointed  out  that  the  typology  failed  to  recognize  the 
gendered  division  of  paid  and  unpaid  work  (Arts  and  Gelissen  2002:  148). 
Esping-Andersen  himself  responded  to  some  of  this  criticism,  and  further 
developed his arguments, in his “Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies” 
(1999).  I  will  draw  upon  two  of  Esping-Andersen's  central  concepts  when 
describing the characteristics of the Swedish model: those of decommodification 
and stratification. Together they can be said to form a two-dimensional property 
space  (Arts  and  Gelissen  2002:  140).  The  later  addition  of  de-familiarization, 
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which is used to capture the degree to which an individual's reliance on the family 
is lessened by a particular regime (Ibid: 45), will not be dealt with. As noted, this 
aspect of the Swedish model is generally not considered to be affected by the 
forces of European integration in the same fundamental way.
Esping-Andersen's work broke with both of the then dominant explanations of 
welfare expansion after the second world war. The first of these, the old “logic of 
industrialism”  school,  held that  nations  more  or  less  followed the same linear 
path. More industrialization equalled higher living standards, causing citizens to 
demand more and more comprehensive welfare provisions. Other scholars echoed 
this view, with the caveat that the driving force behind expansion was working-
class  mobilization  and labour  power.  Both  thus  entertained  a  rather  simplistic 
understanding of welfare states as simply providing “more” or “less” welfare to its 
citizens. The focus was predominately on levels of expenditure (Kleinman 2002: 
32).
But public expenditure is undoubtedly a crude measurement. Esping-Andersen 
sought  to  problematize  the  assumption  that  modern  welfare  states  were,  if 
subjected  to  the  same  stimuli  (industrialization,  working  class  mobilization), 
bound to follow similar trajectories. Fundamental to this is the understanding of 
the modern welfare state as more than the sum of the social policies offered within 
its polity.  Indeed, it constitutes “a new political commitment, a rewritten social 
contract” between the state and its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1999: 34). There is 
not one, but many “logics” of welfare state development. Each is the product of its 
own peculiar historical and institutional circumstances, which it at the same time 
serves to reproduce and uphold. This path-dependency will also influence each 
state's response to external or internal adaptational pressure (Ibid: 172). 
Still,  Esping-Andersen's  sociological  explanation  does  not  mean  that  all 
generalizing ambitions must be done with. It can serve to cluster similar welfare 
states  according  to  their  score  on  the  decommodification  and  stratification 
indicators described below. This clustering in turn forms the basis for his famous 
three-fold  typology  of  conservative,  liberal,  and  social-democratic  welfare 
regimes.  These are sometimes also labelled the Continental,  Anglo-Saxon, and 
Scandinavian regime, denoting their main geographical areas of proliferation in 
the real world. I do however much prefer the original terminology, since it brings 
our attention to the political ideologies which have informed the historical origins 
of each regime. The term “regime” itself is used by Esping-Andersen in order to 
highlight how countries deal with social risks trough different constellations of 
state, market, and family; it is according to him misleading to speak of only the 
welfare  state (1999: 34-35). Put crudely,  the liberal  regime tends to encourage 
market-based solutions, while the conservative to a higher degree relies on the 
family.  Social-democratic  regimes,  lastly,  are  “inevitably  a  state-dominated 
welfare nexus” (Ibid: 80). Why it is so will be explained below. But “regimes” in 
Esping-Andersen's  work are always  ideal-types,  never  thought  to exist  in pure 
form in the real world. I will  hence for the remainder  this thesis use the term 
“welfare state” to refer to this part of the Swedish model. 
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We turn now to the concepts of  decommodification and stratification, which 
together  form  the  basis  of  Esping-Andersen's  sociological  explanation  of  the 
origins and successive developments of the three regimes. The worker's need to 
become decommodified stems from one of the most basic functions of capitalism: 
namely, that it “commodifies” wage-earners, rendering them effectively unable to 
secure their welfare outside the labour contract (Esping-Andersen 1990: 21). This 
was  first  described  by  Karl  Polanyi,  who  showed  how  in  modern  capitalist 
societies work was artificially separated from other human activities and rendered 
a  commodity on the (constructed)  market  (2002 [1944]:  192).  Social  rights  in 
modern  welfare  states  were  in  some  places  designed  to  act  as  countervailing 
forces to this. Decommodification is not an all-or-nothing concept. Rather, it is a 
matter of degree, namely “the degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold 
a  socially  acceptable  standard of  living  independently of  market  participation” 
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 37). Very few real-life welfare states achieve any real 
decommodification to speak of. Still today, and even more so in the past, this is 
further complicated by the fact that most women never become commodified in 
the first place. They remain “pre-commodified”. In order to get on equal footing 
with the majority of men in modern capitalist societies – to gain the same level of 
“independence”, if the term is allowed – many of these women thus need rather to 
be de-familiarized,  i.e.  their reliance on the family for welfare lessened (1999: 
45).
It  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  social  policies  are  inherently 
decommodifying. The case might very well be the opposite: many means-tested 
schemes couple low benefits with high levels of social stigma. They are explicitly 
designed to compel all but the most desperate to participate in the market (Ibid: 
22).  The  decommodifying  potential  of  a  particular  scheme  or  policy  can  be 
assessed along two dimensions. First, eligibility rules and duration: who has the 
right to what and for how long. Second, the level of income replacement offered. 
Also, when analysing an entire regime, it is useful to consider the overall range of 
entitlements.  This  entails  whether  citizens'  are  protected  only against  the most 
basic social  risks or if  the coverage is more comprehensive (Ibid: 47). Liberal 
regimes  typically  only  provide  a  narrow  range  of  needs-based,  means-tested 
benefits at a fairly low level. Some schemes might offer benefits on an equal basis 
for  all  citizens,  but  as  these  are  also  kept  at  a  low  level  they  do  not  really 
constitute genuine options to working. This is why liberal regimes are considered 
the least decommodifying. Conservative regimes, on their hand, remain reliant on 
social insurances where benefits depend almost entirely on contributions through 
employment.  These  schemes  may  indeed  be  rather  generous  in  their  income-
replacement  levels.  But  the  eligibility  rules  nonetheless  renders  them  a  low 
decommodifying score (Ibid: 22-23).  
Stratification is a widely used term in many fields of social  science.  When 
applied  to  this  particular  subject,  it  is  used to  explain  how the  organizational 
features of welfare regimes “help determine the articulation of social solidarity, 
divisions of class, and status differentiation” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 55). This 
means that different regimes by their own inherent nature produce different class-
based coalitions. Stratification is in this way tightly connected to the processes of 
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decommodification  described  above.  Social  policy  in  liberal  regimes  tend  to 
reproduce,  rather than alleviate,  the stratifying  effects  of the market.  First,  the 
system  of  means-tested  poor-relief  leads  to  social  stigma  and  class  dualism. 
Second,  universalistic  social  insurance  at  low  benefit  levels  will  provide 
decommodification only to those with the very lowest levels of income, making 
the majority of citizens reliant on private alternatives (Ibid: 64). In conservative 
regimes, social rights are typically tied to occupational status. In some states, a 
legacy of etatist  paternalism has resulted in a stratification process where civil 
servants  still  enjoy  a  particularly  privileged  position.  The  main  heritage  is 
however  that  of  corporatism.  Built  around “occupational  groupings  seeking to 
uphold traditionally recognized status distinctions”, often encouraged by the state 
and  the  church,  this  system  of  social  policy  provision  also  counteracts  the 
formation of broad class alliances (Ibid: 60).
After this excursion on the characteristics of the liberal and the conservative 
regimes,  we can turn our focus to the central  object  of our investigation.  The 
social-democratic  welfare  regime  guarantees  its  citizens  a  comparatively  high 
degree of decommodification through the services and benefits provided. This is a 
product of the regime's commitment to fuse universalism with generosity and a 
broad conception of what is to be considered a social risk (Esping-Andersen 1996: 
79). We have seen that liberal regimes might also carry a universalistic trait by 
granting certain benefits as a matter of right (rather than need). What is unique 
about  the  social-democratic  approach  lays  in  “the  quality  and arrangement  of 
social rights, not in their existence per se” (1990: 47). Since the purpose of the 
social-democratic regime is to close of the market in order to maximize equality, 
it is not enough to ensure that most citizens are eligible. It is only when social 
services and schemes are upgraded to cater to the needs and tastes of the middle 
classes  that  a  virtuous  circle  of  sorts  can  be  achieved:  “All  benefit;  all  are 
dependent; and all will presumably feel obliged to pay” (Ibid: 28). 
According to Esping-Andersen, this universalism of middle-class standard has 
led to the “consolidation of a vast popular majority wedded to its [the welfare 
state's] defence” (1990: 69). A more detailed explanation for this phenomena has 
been proposed by Swedish political scientist Bo Rothstein. Whether a particular 
welfare scheme or service gains popular support depends on it being perceived as 
substantively just, meaning it has to be based on acceptable normative principles. 
But  the  issue  of  procedural  justice  is  perhaps  even  more  important.  Whereas 
means-tested benefits  easily  become stigmatizing  and might  lead to a  division 
between “strivers” and “skivers”, universalistic policies are more likely to be seen 
as just in this respect. Provision on the basis of equal rights greatly simplifies the 
system, makes the division of responsibilities between bureaucrats more clear-cut, 
and renders the expensive control apparatus superfluous. The public has less of an 
incentive to worry about “welfare scroungers” and issues of free-riding (2006: 
193).  Rothstein  and  other  scholars  working  in  the  “Quality  of  Government”-
school  thus  point  to  an  important  factor  at  the  micro  level:  the  need  to 
conceptualize support for the welfare state as dependent both on citizens' trust in 
welfare providers, and on the level of reciprocal trust between citizens (Rothstein, 
8
Samanni  and  Teorell  2012:  10).  Both  of  these  are  enhanced  by  universal 
provision. 
2.2 Industrial relations
After this excursion into the foundations of the Swedish welfare state, we turn our 
attention to Sweden's system of industrial relations. This is an essential addition 
for  a  multitude  of  reasons.  First,  the  two  institutions  have  become  largely 
interwoven  and  mutually  dependent,  and  should  be  studied  as  such  (Esping-
Andersen  1990:  149).  Industrial  relations  are  defined  here  as  the  interplay 
between labour, employers and the state. I have thus chosen not to include aspects 
often  studied  in  the  literature  on  “Varieties  of  Capitalism”  (see  for  example 
Höpner and Schäfer 2010), such as industrial policy, corporate governance, etc. 
These  are  undoubtedly  important  characteristics  of  the  national  economy in  a 
wider sense, but arguably less directly connected to the mechanisms central to this 
thesis. It is easy to see how social policy can have significant impact on the labour 
market by decommodifying workers. But it is also true that systems of industrial 
relations may be “instrumentalized to serve welfare-state purposes” through the 
regulation of wages and working conditions (Scharpf and A. Smith 2000: 11). As 
we will see, this has historically often been the case in Sweden.
When characterizing different systems of industrial relations, Scharpf and A. 
Smith (2000) have proposed a useful two-dimensional model. They distinguish, 
firstly, between systems of coordinated and uncoordinated wage bargaining, and 
secondly, between those with a high degree of state involvement and those where 
employers and labour are left largely to their own (Ibid: 12). Sweden was long 
recognized  as  the  ideal-type  corporatist  regime.  This  entailed  a  highly 
coordinated, nation-wide system of wage bargaining where the “social partners”, 
i.e.  the peak-level  associations  of business and unions,  met  in institutionalized 
settings.  From this  position  they  were  highly  involved  in  shaping  social  and 
economic  policy  choices  of  the  state.  Though  there  was  significant  state 
involvement  as  far  as  facilitating  and institutionalizing  these negotiations,  this 
should not be interpreted as saying that the state interfered in the setting of wages 
(Ibid: 13).  
It is commonly noted that the social-democratic welfare regime is critically 
dependent  upon  the  maintenance  of  high,  if  not  full,  employment  (Esping-
Andersen  1990:  28).  The  rationale  behind  this  is  both  economical  and 
sociological.  First,  and perhaps most obvious,  there is  the financial  element;  a 
comprehensive, universalistic welfare model is a costly thing, and a substantial 
portion of the financing needs must almost inevitably be covered by payroll taxes. 
The  sociological  part  ties  into  the  discussion  above  about  free-riders  and 
reciprocal trust. In a society where everyone is seen as contributing to the best of 
their abilities, citizens' trust tends to be higher – both in one's neighbour and in the 
state.  Such  virtuous  circles  are  a  prerequisite  for  the  viability  of  the  social 
democratic regime. It can also be argued, in line with proponents of the “power 
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resource theory”, that employment should be considered the basic power resource 
of the working class. When unemployment rises, the supply of labour does too, 
and  prices  (i.e.  wages)  fall.  Workers  become  increasingly  commodified.  This 
redistributes power in favour of employers who are more prone to call for welfare 
state retrenchment (Korpi 2003: 592; Korpi and Palme 2003: 428).
Full  employment  during  les  trentes  glorieuses was  achieved  in  Sweden 
primarily through the intricate arrangement known as the Rehn-Meidner model, 
named  after  the  two  union  economists  seen  as  its  main  architects.  The  basic 
premise was that wages ought to be determined by the nature of the work rather 
than the employers' ability to pay. This served to create a more compressed wage 
structure  (Pontusson 1992:  312-313).  As  a  consequence,  less  productive  firms 
were eliminated while those surviving the competitive environment could prosper. 
Workers laid off due to this rationalizing process could count on a wide range of 
active  labour  market  policies  as  well  as  a  generous  unemployment  insurance. 
This, along with demand management though monetary and fiscal policy, was the 
state's  part  of  the  deal  (Ryner  2003:  83).  But  the  Rehn-Meidner-model  was 
perhaps even more dependent on union strength for its successful implementation. 
This  was because it  necessitated a highly centralized  wage bargaining system, 
which  enabled  unions  to  resist  wage  drift  which  otherwise  would  have 
jeopardized productivity growth (Brenner and Bindgaard Vad 2000: 403). In sum, 
the  Rehn-Meidner  model  formed  an  integral  part  of  the  Swedish  model.  By 
ensuring  full  employment,  it  mitigated  the  disciplinary  effects  of  the  labour 
market. It was the institutional framework which “rendered the universal welfare 
state compatible with the reproduction of the national capitalist society” (Ryner 
2003: 85).
In contrast, the so called “Third road” economic policies favoured by the SAP 
in the 80s diverged from the traditional system in some important aspects. Most 
notably, unions' capacity for wage restraint was diminished. The centre piece of 
the strategy for recovery from the international economic slump of the late 70s 
was a  rather  massive  devaluation  of  the currency.  During the first  half  of  the 
decade  this  path  seemed  rather  successful.  But  eventually,  fuelled  by  the 
deregulation of capital markets, the economy overheated and inflation soared. The 
unions' capacity for wage restraint was tested to the limit, and would ultimately 
prove insufficient (Brenner and Bundgaard Vad 2000: 423). Steinmo argues that 
this was further exacerbated by the expansion of public sector employment,  as 
wages in this sector were not subject to the disciplinary effects of international 
competition (2010: 36). This is somewhat contradicted by Ryner's  account.  He 
emphasizes instead how the state as an employer strove to keep a lid on public 
sector wages, while much of the export-oriented manufacturing sector was subject 
to  wage  drift  despite  a  lack  of  corresponding  productivity  gains  (2003:  151). 
Regardless, the result was intra-union competition, fragmentation of bargaining, 
and a cost-push inflationary spiral which eventually (when demand for exports 
fell) contributed to the fiscal crisis of the 90s (Ibid: 52).
Even if Swedish corporatism certainly is not the same today as in the 70s, the 
overall picture seems to be one of “resilience rather than collapse and continuity 
rather  than  change”  (Wood 2001:  402).  And as  noted  by several  authors,  the 
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competitive advantage of Sweden's industrial relations regime still relies on strong 
unions which are able to maintain the overall  competitiveness of the economy 
through  responsible  wage  increases.  The  main  difference  has  been  a  move 
towards  the  German  model  of  industry-level,  but  still  highly  coordinated, 
bargaining  (Hubert  and Stephens 2001:  132).  A somewhat  contrasting view is 
provided by Lindvall  and Sebring.  Their  study shows that,  in  some important 
respects, both the institutional and normative foundations of Swedish corporatism 
have disappeared.  This has led to less “horizontal  coordination” between trade 
unions  and employers'  organizations,  as  these have become more  partisan and 
more closely tied to the political left and right, respectively (2005: 1063). This 
does however not take away from the fact that the Swedish model still entrusts the 
social partners with a great deal of autonomy and responsibility when it comes to 
labour market regulation.
The fit  between welfare models  and different  ways  of  managing industrial 
relations  is  far  from  perfect.  Even  though  Esping-Andersen  notes  that 
“comprehensive, universalistic welfare states almost invariably go hand-in-hand 
with centralized,  nation-wide and co-ordinated bargaining” (1999: 17),  he also 
admits  that  the overall  relationship is  rather  weak (Ibid:  21).  Others make the 
observation that social democratic welfare states tend to be corporatist, with high 
union coverage, low wage dispersion, and high female employment (Hubert and 
Stephens 2001: 117). This is an empirically observable fact. But it is equally true 
that  there  seems  to  be  no  simple  causal  relationship.  There  are,  for  example, 
significant differences between the Scandinavian social democratic welfare states' 
coordinated bargaining systems – and Sweden especially has remained distinct 
(Tallberg et al 2010: 114). However, the existence of neat and tidy causalities is 
irrelevant  for  our  purposes.  What  matters  is,  first  of  all,  that  which  has  been 
shown  above:  that  the  Swedish  welfare  model  and  the  model  of  industrial 
relations are intimately connected and mutually reinforcing institutions. The social 
partners  played  an instrumental  role  in  the expansion of the welfare  state  and 
continues to form an indispensable cornerstone of the system today. Secondly, we 
need to properly understand the modern-day relationship between the SAP and the 
“second leg”  of  the  labour  movement,  i.e.  the  trade  unions,  since  this  should 
potentially inform the SAP:s choice of action in the cases studied. I will return to 
this point below.
2.3 The usefulness of regimes
Esping-Andersen goes on to show that when operationalized in a proper fashion 
and applied to real-world welfare states, these states do indeed cluster into three 
rather  distinct  sets  of  regimes.  The  mechanisms  thus  seem to  possess  a  high 
degree  of  explanatory  power.  As touched upon above,  “The Three  Worlds  of 
Welfare Capitalism” reinvigorated the debate on the welfare state, sparking a new 
wave of research that has either sought to refine, complement or sometimes reject 
its  findings. Some have called for additional  types  to be added to the original 
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three, for example a “Mediterranean” regime (Arts and Gelissen 2002: 142). Most 
authors, however, seem to have been occupied with developing new and better 
indicators  and  statistical  techniques  for  measurement  (Ferragina  and  Seeleb-
Kaiser 2011: 587). Which programmes, schemes, and policies of the welfare state 
are relevant for determining its propensity to decommodify and the class alliances 
it  will  produce?  Esping-Andersen  himself  chose  to  analyse  old-age  pensions, 
unemployment insurance, and sickness benefits (1990: 49). It has been argued that 
most  studies which have shown a deviation from Esping-Andersen's  clustering 
can be explained by the inclusion of variables which are not really related to either 
decommodification or stratification, and that healthcare and education (Ferragina 
and Seeleb-Kaiser 2011: 587). But surely, according to the logic outlined above, 
also  the  provision  of  these  services  should  influence  the  formation  of  class 
solidarity  in  a  society.  A  universal  right  to  high-quality,  publicly  provided 
healthcare should lead to the same kind of broad alliances that, say, a similarly 
designed unemployment insurance would. 
Criticism none withstanding, a rather clear academic consensus has emerged 
regarding  Sweden  as  a  near-perfect  real-world  representative  of  the  social 
democratic  welfare  regime.  This  findning  continues  to  be  confirmed  almost 
irrespective of the indicators used in research (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Berg and 
Ö. Erlingsson 2008; Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Kammer, Niehues and 
Peichl 2012). Some scholars disagree: for example, Brenner and Bundgaard Vad 
claim that Sweden's “model-like coherence” has effectively disappeared, and that 
some aspects were lost as early as the late 1970s (2000: 414). But such a strict  
definition is of little use for the purposes of this thesis. As emphasized above, 
focus will lie on the most fundamental mechanisms of the Swedish model,  i.e. 
those of decommodification and stratification, as these are presumed to work to 
the advantage of the SAP. Certainly,  cuts in specific welfare schemes might be 
interpreted as a slow and steady erosion, constituting a systemic shift over time. 
But as to this date the underlying logic of the model still seems to hold up quite 
well. And as noted, public support remains high, indicating a rather robust cross-
class alliance.
As noted by Robert Cox in his characterization of the Scandinavian welfare 
model, it is the values rather than the specific policies that matter, in the sense that 
allusions  to  universalism and  solidarity  can  serve  to  legitimize  a  rather  wide 
spectrum of reforms (2004: 205). This of course ties into the theories of discourse 
and “logic of appropriateness” further described below. I would however disagree 
with  Cox'  claim  that  the  model  has  been  “shot  full  of  contradictions  and 
inconsistencies”,  rendering  it  useless  for  theoretical  purposes  (Ibid:  216).  The 
underlying mechanisms and concepts developed by Esping-Andersen and other 
welfare scholars have proven to possess plenty of explanatory power, and hence 
remain valuable (Hubert and Stephens 2001: 108). Ideal-types of this kind can 
provide guidance when theorizing about the impact of different factors on specific 
welfare models, for example when formulating hypotheses.
From the  mechanisms  outlined  above,  it  seems  highly  unlikely  that  social 
democratic parties should ever want to push a predominately social democratic 
regime,  such as Sweden, in a more liberal  or conservative direction.  Not only 
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would  it  be  at  odds  with  their  basic  ideological  preferences.  It  would  also 
undermine the stratifying mechanisms that help shape the broad class-coalitions 
which have made their electoral success possible. 
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3 Challenges to national welfare states
Regardless  of  one's  view on  the  existence  (or  desirability)  of  common  social 
policy  at  the  EU  level,  one  question  looms  in  the  background:  what  are  the 
consequences of European integration for the national welfare state? As we have 
noted, economic globalization during the last thirty years has circumscribed the 
policy space left for individual states. Competition is stiffer, capital moves at the 
blink of an eye, and firms readily relocates production to cut costs. And at the 
same time most countries in the developed world face demographical challenges 
in the form of ageing populations. But has European integration exaggerated the 
effects  of  these  developments?  And  have  the  effects  been  equally  felt  by  all 
member states? The answers to these questions,  according to many authors,  is 
“yes” and “no”, respectively. Below, I will offer a more general explanation of 
how political  and judicial  developments  at  the  EU level  has  affected  national 
welfare  states.  Following  this  will  be  some  of  the  points  made  by  Fritz  W. 
Scharpf,  who has  written  extensively  on  the  subject  and its  consequences  for 
“coordinated market economies” such as Sweden.
3.1 Boundaries eroded
Social rights can be seen as “demanding political products”, in the sense that they 
require both material resources and a certain degree of moral commitment from 
citizens (Ferrera 2005: 46). The former depends on the latter; the willingness to 
pay the taxes required to finance welfare provisions derives from a mutual feeling 
of solidarity between the members of a society.
But as the crisis has shown time and again, the moral  commitment felt  by 
citizens of Europe towards one another is not yet sufficiently strong to allow for 
such transfers between member states. This is in fact very much in line with what 
the “founding fathers” of the Union envisioned. The dominant philosophy of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 was that social policy and issues affecting the welfare 
state  should remain a national  prerogative.  The pie was to be made bigger by 
greater economic openness and liberalizations, but how to divide it was left for 
each member state to decide (Falkner 2009: 9; Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 349). 
The birth and gradual expansion of the welfare state was intimately linked to other 
aspects of nation building in post-war Europe. In the words of Maurizio Ferrera, 
les trentes glorieuses meant unprecedented levels of both welfare state “closure” 
and “lock-in” at the national level (2005: 75). Closure refers to the restrictions 
placed upon the access to welfare provisions by non-nationals. In some cases it 
was possible for foreign workers to gain access to social insurance benefits, but 
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mostly  these  were  tied  to  temporary  residence  and work permits.  The lock-in 
effect  was  the  other  side  of  the  same  coin.  It  meant  that  the  institutional 
arrangements  of  the  welfare  state  more  or  less  forced  its  citizens  to  become 
members of public schemes (Ibid). Territorial  belonging constituted the central 
organizing principle (Ferrera 2008: 84). Drawing on the work of Stein Rokkan, 
this leads Ferrera to conclude that the European welfare state during this period 
reached its greatest degree of both internal and external closure, while at the same 
time becoming more encompassing than ever before. These developments were 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing (2005: 76).
These  assumptions  form  the  starting  point  for  Ferrera's  analysis  of  how 
European integration affects the member states' ability to uphold the traditional 
boundaries of social citizenship. The central argument is that the last twenty-five 
years or so of European integration has created a new “spatial  politics” of the 
welfare state. By imposing restrictions on member states'  power to control the 
different aspects of both internal  and external closure that the national  welfare 
state developed dependent on, EU policies and ECJ rulings have given rise to a 
“destructuring  of  internal  constellations”  (2005:  120).  These  internal 
constellations  consist  of  for  example  institutional  arrangements,  political 
cleavages, and centre-periphery relations – all of which helped shape the country-
specific characteristics of European welfare states (and continues to do so) (Ibid: 
167-169). Citizens' capacity for exit from, and transnational business ability for 
entry into, national welfare systems has been greatly increased (Davies 2006: 27). 
But it is also worth noting that a corresponding mobilization  against entry has 
taken place in some places. Several countries has seen rising populist sentiments 
as  a  reaction  against  the  perceived  threat  of  “welfare  tourism”,  when  free 
movement  grants  EU-migrants  access  to  previously  closed  national  welfare 
systems (Ferrera 2005: 220).
The foundations for this accelerating process of destructuring were laid early. 
Already in 1963 the ECJ confirmed that EU law had to be seen as constituting a 
distinct legal order capable of having direct effect (Van Gend & Loos, C-26/62). 
This gave individuals the possibility of deriving subjective rights from it against 
their  respective  states.  The  following  year,  with  the  Costa  vs.  Enel  (C-6/64) 
ruling, the Court famously stated the supremacy of EU law in relation to the law 
of the member states. 
Central to the whole issue of “integration through law” and market-making 
liberalization is the question of which impediments to free movement in the EU 
are to be tolerated. In Dassonville (C-8/74), the ECJ made a wide interpretation of 
what is now article 28 TFEU. All measures which “directly or indirectly, actually 
or potentially” hindered intra-community trade should according to the Court be 
seen as having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions (Ibid: para. 5). The 
ensuing Cassis (C-120/79) ruling established when exemptions to this general rule 
could be allowed. The central issue became whether restrictions could be seen as 
necessary to satisfy one or several of the “mandatory requirements” listed: “the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions, and the defence of the consumer” (Ibid: para. 8). This 
development had the effect of establishing a “procedural asymmetry” where the 
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Court's interpretative discretion in relation to the “mandatory requirements” was 
maximized.  The  burden  of  proof  was  shifted  to  the  member  states.  And  if  a 
restriction was accepted, it still had to pass a proportionality test (Scharpf 2009: 
12). An equally important (and perhaps more famous) consequence of Cassis was 
the principle of mutual recognition – or, as it is sometimes called, the country of 
origin principle. This meant that a product “lawfully produced and marketed in 
one member state” must be considered good enough for the whole of the EU, and 
thus be sold in any market unless the mandatory requirements could be invoked 
(C-120/79 para. 14). 
Dassonville and Cassis involved the free movement of goods. Case law has 
developed in somewhat different fashion with regard to services (both concerning 
cross-border  service  provision  of  temporary  nature,  and  more  permanent 
operations,  i.e.  establishment).  But  the  fundamental  principles  at  work  are 
essentially the same, as illustrated by the Gebhard (C-55/94) case. There the ECJ 
concluded that national regulations that had the potential of hindering the exercise 
of a fundamental freedom had to fulfil four requirements: “they must be applied in 
a non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in 
the  general  interest;  they  must  be  suitable  for  securing  the  attainment  of  the 
objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order  to  attain  it”  (Ibid:  para.  39).  And as  for  goods,  restrictions  on  the  free 
movement  of  services  include  those  which  are  only  potential  and indirect.  In 
reality  this  has  come  to  mean  also  cases  without  any  apparent  cross-border 
element (Gekiere, Baeten and Palm 2010: 474).
For a service to be subject to free movement,  it  needs first of all  to be of 
economic  nature.  This  generally  means  that  is  has  to  be  provided  for 
remuneration, i.e. a financial transaction of some sort has to take place (art. 50 
TEU).  Similarly,  EU  competition  law  becomes  applicable  when  an  entity 
(undertaking) carries out a service in exchange for a market-like transaction. Such 
transactions indicate that there is a structural potential for competition and choice 
(Davies 2006: 16). It should be noted that while competition law and the freedom 
to provide services (whether temporary or permanently) often overlap in specific 
cases, they need not always do so. As pointed out by the Advocate General in the 
FENIN case, actors performing services for remuneration are not automatically to 
be considered undertakings subject to competition law (C-205/03: para. 51). But 
the two legal concepts can arguably be said to make up two sides of the same 
deregulatory coin.
One can hence argue that the ball is in the member states' court; unless they 
create  such  “proto-markets”  in  their  welfare  services,  economic  law  remains 
inapplicable. But in the EU today most states have already introduced vouchers, 
payment by result etc. in efforts to contain costs and increase choice. Most have 
also already allowed for private domestic providers to enter these systems (Ibid: 
20). When such steps have been taken, it becomes very hard to deny entry for 
foreign providers – or to deny the full spectrum of EU economic law to become 
applicable (Greer and Rauscher 2011: 801). It can be noted that the Court so far 
has been slightly more inclined to allow for national exemptions from competition 
law than from freedom of movement.  For example,  in AOK Bundesverband it 
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conceded  that  “some  competition”  might  be  introduced  into  national  welfare 
services without them being subject to the whole body of EU law (joined cases C-
264/01, C-306/01, C-354-01 and C-355-01: para. 56). This ruling hardly served to 
clarify  matters,  and  it  remains  to  be  seen  just  how much  competition  “some 
competition” means in practice (Prosser 2010: 324; Edwardsson 2007: 72).
The principle of mutual recognition has been an especially contested subject in 
recent years. The issue has been that the principle, when applied to services, has 
very  different  and  more  far-reaching  consequences  than  when  goods  are 
concerned.  Firstly,  for  services  consumption  nearly  always  coincides  with 
production. This entails either that the consumer travels to another member state, 
or, as more often in the cases brought before the ECJ, that the producer does so 
(Höpner and Schäfer 2010: 352). And because of this merging of production and 
consumption,  process  standards  –  i.e.  the  rules  governing  how  a  service  is 
produced, including labour law and corporate law – are much more important for 
producers' ability to differentiate their product in the market. This gives producers 
the incentive to engage in “forum-shopping” and locate  production in member 
states with less stringent regulation. They would then still be able to rely on their 
freedom of movement and the principle of mutual recognition in order to carry out 
business across borders (K. Schmidt 2009: 852). The controversies surrounding 
the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) resulted in a restriction of the scope of the 
directive as well as any explicit mentioning of “country of origin” being removed 
(Ibid 2011: 44). Contrary to the intentions of the member states and the European 
Parliament, this does not seem to have changed the ECJ's interpretations of the 
fundamental freedoms listed in the Treaty.
 In the cases analysed below I will  offer more detailed descriptions of the 
areas of healthcare and labour law/industrial relations. The cumulative effect of 
the case law has been that the direct effect of EU law now has become applicable 
in areas few member states had envisioned only ten years ago (K. Schmidt 2011: 
39). Furthermore, it can be argued that many national political actors have either 
failed to fully appreciate, or chosen do downplay, the fact that jurisprudence has 
indeed  gone as  far  as  it  has;  EU law is  in  this  respect  “in a  strange state  of 
unfulfilled potential” (Davies 2006: 13). This observation brings us to the next 
section. 
3.2 The structural bias for negative integration
When  explaining  the  liberalizing  thrust  of  the  last  twenty-five  years,  Scharpf 
emphasizes the importance of the institutional arrangements of the EU and the 
decision  rules  therein.  This  aspect,  he  argues,  has  been neglected  by scholars 
working in both the intergovernmentalist  and neofunctionalist  traditions.  These 
have been too occupied with the policy preferences of actors, either in the form of 
member states' governments or the supranational institutions such as the ECJ or 
the Commission (1999: 64-67). This is not to say that we should do away with 
agency as an explanatory factor altogether. But when trying to capture the overall 
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thrust and direction of the European project, structural factors needs to be given 
due weight (2009: 6-7).
The central distinction is that between “positive” and “negative” integration. 
Positive integration refers to the process of political decision-making where the 
member  states  and  the  supranational  institutions  propose,  agree  upon,  and 
implement  common  legislation  which  replaces  national  laws.  According  to 
Scharpf  and  other  advocates  of  this  perspective,  the  absence  of  positive 
integration  in  the  area  of  social  policy  is  hardly  surprising.  They  note  that 
agreement was hard to come by even among the original six founding member 
states, despite the fact that these shared many traits in the area and broadly can be 
said to (at least at the time) have belonged to the conservative welfare regime 
(Scharpf  2009:  8).  Even  though  formal  unanimity  requirements  have  been 
somewhat  relaxed in the area of social  policy following the Maastricht  Treaty 
(Falkner 2009: 10), formal and informal rules on consensus in the Council still 
often leads to proposals getting stuck in the “joint-decision trap” (Ibid 2011: 3-5). 
Depending on the policy area concerned, there are a however a number of 
possible ways out of this trap. The ambitious relaunch of European integration 
project in the 80s, consisting of the completion of the internal market and the first 
steps  towards  the  EMU,  was  made  possible  largely  thanks  to  a  thrust  of 
“integration through law”, i.e. a more activist role for the ECJ (K. Schmidt 2011: 
41).  The  member  state  economies  were  diagnosed  as  stagnant,  inflexible  and 
uncompetitive. All in all, the emerging consensus was that only a “quantum leap 
in  terms  of  economic  integration  and competition  rules  and discipline”  would 
suffice to get Europe back on its feet (Ferrera 2005: 113). The efforts to achieve 
this  would  primarily  come  to  centre  around  what  Scharpf  terms  “negative 
integration”, in particular through the principle of mutual recognition described 
above  (1999:  48).  It  offered  a  way  of  advancing  the  project  of  European 
integration without having to engage in the increasingly cumbersome process of 
harmonization.
Again, it needs to be stressed is that Scharpf does not view this as primarily an 
ideological choice, neither by national or supranational actors. Rather it should be 
interpreted  in  structural  terms  by  focusing  on  the  “path-dependent  doctrinal 
development” led by the ECJ (2009: 23, n. 40). What began with the principles of 
supremacy and direct effect in the 60's, and continued in the 70's with the cases of 
Dassonville and Cassis, provided a “ratcheting mechanism” for negative, Court-
led integration through the abolishment of national regulations (Ibid).  
Some  genuine  harmonization  of  social  policy  did  occur  in  the  90's.  The 
member  states  were,  for  example,  able  to  agree  on  common  minimum  rules 
regulating health and safety in the workplace. And not all forms of deregulation 
can be seen as purely “market-making”.  Some aspects  of gender equality was 
improved as several national rules and practices restricting women's access to the 
labour market were struck down during the process (Ferrera 2005: 116). The mid-
90's  also  saw the  European  centre-left  gaining  ground,  with  social-democratic 
governments taking office in several member states. The “Employment Title” in 
the  Amsterdam  Treaty  of  1999  was  a  product  of  this  growing  transnational 
cooperation  between  Europe's  social  democrats  (Johansson  1999).  The  corner 
1
stone of the Title was the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The OMC, as a 
new and “softer” form of policy making relying on bench-marking and learning 
between  member  states,  promised  to  break  the  stalemate  that  the  unanimity 
requirements  of  the Council  had hitherto  posed and has  since  spread to  other 
politically sensitive areas (Falkner 2009: 8).
How has this been possible given the difficulties of harmonization? According 
to K. Schmidt  one possible explanation is that the member states simply have 
sought to pre-empt  further  action  by the ECJ, the Commission,  and/or  private 
actors. They have thus agreed to measures “against their interests” in an effort to 
settle  the  matter  once and for  all  (2011:  49).  And as  for  the  OMC and other 
innovations in the field, Scharpf concludes that the policies pursued through these 
instruments face the same constraints as member states do otherwise, as they are 
subject to the same EU legislation (2002: 655). Such initiatives hence have little 
to contribute to the creation of a more embedded or “social” market economy.  
As has been suggested above, there is ample evidence that there is not only 
one,  but  several,  ways  to  prosperity  for  advanced  capitalist  states  in  today's 
globalized  economy  (Scharpf  and  A.  Schmidt  2000;  Esping-Andersen  1999; 
Höpner and Schäfer 2010). Any predictions regarding the inevitable convergence 
around  any  one  “model”  or  “regime”,  whether  discussing  welfare  states  or 
systems of industrial relations, has proven premature indeed. Sweden's ability to 
uphold a stable economic performance whilst at the same time remaining true to 
the core characteristics  of the social  democratic  welfare model  should prove a 
case in point (Steinmo 2010: 44). Scharpf's central argument is that the current 
path of European integration dramatically alters this balance. For “social market 
economies”,  which  are  characterized  by  combining  a  social  democratic  or  a 
conservative welfare model with a highly coordinated market economy (implying 
for  example  various  forms  of  corporate  industrial  relations  and  relatively 
regulated labour markets), the implications will be significant (Scharpf 2009: 25). 
They  can  be  summarized  by  the  figure  below.  It  shows  how  social  market 
economies  (SME:s),  as  a  consequence  of  negative  integration,  will  have  the 
national institutions underpinning their comparative advantages dismantled as the 
EU  moves  invariably  into  the  upper  right  corner,  a  liberal  European  market 
economy (EME). Liberal market economies, such as the UK, Ireland, and many 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe, will have ample reasons to support 
this development as it plays to their economic advantage (Ibid: 29).  
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The series  of controversial  decisions  taken by the ECJ in for  example  the 
Viking (C-438/05), Laval (C-341/05), Rüffert  (C-346/06) and Luxembourg (C-
319/06) cases will be dealt with in more detail in the next chapter. In short, these 
judgements have disallowed national regulations concerning the right to strike, the 
right to collective bargaining, and legislative wage determination, since they were 
deemed  to  impede  the  exercise  of  the  freedom  of  establishment  or  service 
provision  (Scharpf  2009:  21).  As  we  have  seen  in  previous  chapters,  these 
developments affects  the very cornerstones of the Swedish model  of industrial 
relations;  as  Scharpf  puts  it,  “the  Court’s  decisions  are  undermining  the 
institutional  foundations  on  which  the  comparative  advantages  of  coordinated 
market economies have depended” (Ibid: 27). Diminishing union power can, all 
else being equal,  be presumed to lead to more fragmented bargaining and less 
wage restraint. Higher labour costs would in turn render Swedish companies less 
competitive and cause unemployment to rise. 
For welfare services in these countries, the deregulatory effects of negative 
integration  through  ECJ  jurisprudence  has  equally  disruptive  potential.  The 
subjection of these areas to EU competition law and free movement principles 
clearly runs counter to the most basic purpose of social democratic welfare states: 
the  struggle  to  “deliberately  close  of  the  market  so  as  to  maximize  equality” 
(Esping-Andersen 1999: 79). Marketization of welfare services risks undermining 
the cross-class coalitions whose support Sweden's welfare model  depend on in 
two simultaneous movements.  Firstly,  the financial  balance of universal public 
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(Scharpf 2009: 27)
services depends crucially on the state's ability to plan and regulate both provision 
and consumption. The former is made more difficult by the introduction of new 
private providers, while the latter is complicated by both the exit of the state's own 
citizens  (for  example  for  seeking  medical  treatment  abroad)  and  the  entry  of 
foreign citizens (Scharpf 2009: 28-29). This poses threats to the financial viability 
of  the  welfare  state  and  might  induce  retrenchment,  leading  to  deteriorating 
middle-class support when the quality of services suffers.
Secondly,  the  introduction  of  competition  would  necessitate  a  significantly 
more elaborate control system. If states lose control over the provision of services, 
this will be the only way of retaining their commitment to equality.  As Davies 
notes: “Good, or tight, regulation can therefore fashion public institutions out of 
private components, and there is therefore no automatic decline in the sense of 
shared experience in a move to a regulated market” (2006: 49). In contrast, an 
inescapable aspect of market principles free at work is that there will, from time to 
time, be some providers that are “worse” than others. Equality is challenged, and 
citizens' will be stratified according to different logics. Those with the financial 
means to do so might be tempted to seek private solutions of higher quality. 
Unless this asymmetry is in some way addressed, the consequence will not 
only  be  a  gradual  dismantling  of  social  democratic  and  conservative  welfare 
models. According to Ferrera, the current path will eventually cause a “political 
backlash” with “defensive mobilisation around the status quo” (2008: 90). Scharpf 
stresses that the institutional arrangements of today's EU are simply unable to deal 
with nationally salient issues in a satisfactory way. The principle of subsidiarity is 
insufficient in this respect. As a legal concept, it needs always to be interpreted in 
a uniform and predictable way. This makes it impossible for the Court to include 
country-specific  political  and  normative  aspects,  for  example  related  to  the 
welfare  state  and  systems  of  industrial  relations,  however  democratically 
legitimate these might be (2009: 22). 
One's view of the potential  for change within the current system of course 
comes  down to  one's  interpretation  of  how  we  got  here  in  the  first  place;  a 
structural explanation (in line with Scharpf) necessitates structural change. The 
problem that arises from the asymmetry between positive and negative integration 
is that the member states have lost control over national systems, without being 
able to counteract this by common legislation at the supranational level (Sindbjerg 
Martinsen  and  Falkner  2011:  129).  This  exacerbates  the  disruptive  impact  of 
globalization  in  general;  rather  than providing a common response to mitigate 
these challenges, the EU serves to further circumscribe national problem-solving 
capacity (Scharpf 1999: 193). It is also the case that negative integration through 
judicial  activism by the  Court  is  extremely  hard  to  reverse.  The only  way of 
affecting  the  ECJ's  interpretation  of  the  Treaties  is  to  change  the  Treaties 
themselves  –  which  of  course  requires  unanimity  and  is  subject  to  the  same 
difficulties  that led to the preference for negative integration in the first  place 
(2009: 10). Despite explicitly seeking to exclude several nationally salient policy 
areas from the reach of EU economic law, the member states have not been able 
to hinder the extension of Treaty-based, fundamental freedoms into these areas as 
well (Ibid: 23).
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4 A theoretical framework
The aim of this section is to construct a theoretical framework that can explain 
why and in what ways the SAP has acted in the cases analysed. In doing so, I 
intend  to  draw  on  relevant  findings  from  both  theories  in  the  field  of 
Europeanization,  and  the  research  done  on  welfare  state  retrenchment.  The 
concept of “misfit” forms the basis for my analysis as a precondition for the SAP 
to  mobilize.  It  will  be  further  elaborated  upon before  presenting  the  different 
potential causes for this misfit and other explanatory factors emphasized in the 
literature.
4.1 The roots and causes of misfit
Neither Europeanization or welfare state retrenchment literature contain theories 
that can be handily applied to the cases in this study without varying degrees of 
modification.  Both  tend  predominately  to  be  concerned  with  explaining  or 
measuring observable  change in different  national  domains. Europeanization is 
commonly used to describe how processes of European integration affects and 
causes  (or  fails  to  cause)  change  in  the  policies,  politics,  and  polities  of  the 
member states (Börzel and Risse 2000: 2-3). Similarly, the study of welfare state 
retrenchment involves analysing how modern welfare states have responded (or 
failed to respond) to challenges posed by for example unemployment, declining 
productivity growth, changing demographics, or increasing middle class demand 
for service differentiation. Both these processes thus aims at explaining some sort 
of change – or lack thereof. This necessitates modification of some theories and 
exclusion of others.
Both Europeanization and retrenchment research is naturally mostly occupied 
with governments and their actions. The institutional design of the EU holds a 
prominent  place  for  governments  as  legislators,  although  sometimes  (and 
increasingly often) in tandem with the European Parliament. National parliaments 
and political parties in opposition have few means by which to formally feed into 
the policy process. But some theories of Europeanization do consider the response 
of national actors more broadly and might thus be useful for my purposes. The 
same can be said of many theories of welfare retrenchment; they deal with more 
general  phenomena  such  as  the  role  of  organized  interests  or  economic 
constraints, and how these affect actors' room for manoeuvre. The modifications 
undertaken  nevertheless  reduces  the  cumulativity  of  the  study  and  its 
comparability with previous research in either field (George and Bennett 2005: 
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71). I will return to this issue in the final chapter when discussing the results and 
their generalizability. 
I  have  taken  inspiration  from Vivien  A.  Schmidt's  writings  on “discursive 
institutionalism”.   Her  central  argument  is  that  this  aspect  has  been  under-
theorized and under-researched in many studies of Europeanization, in the sense 
that they do not include an analysis of how the existence of a misfit to some extent 
must be viewed as discursively constructed (A. Schmidt and Radaelli 2006: 187). 
Most theories simply do not account for how discourse can act as an “enabling” 
factor,  to  “overcome  or  neutralize  interest-based  opposition  by  appealing  to 
commonly  accepted  or  newly  activated  values  and  normative  criteria  of 
appropriateness” (A. Schmidt 2000: 308). It should be noted that “discourse” here 
is defined as “who said what to whom where and why”, which is analysed in order 
to explain how ideas influence collective action (2010: 15). It is thus not seen as 
coming with certain ontological or epistemological presumptions (A. Schmidt and 
Radaelli 2006: 194). 
The value  of  discourse  (in  the  sense  described above)  to  the  study of  the 
welfare  state  in  general  and  the  Swedish  model  in  particular  are  obvious. 
Following Esping-Andersen, most scholars have come to emphasize the persistent 
differences and path-dependency of national models, rather than succumbing to a 
“end  of  history”  theory  of  inevitable  convergence.  While  the  underlying 
mechanisms of decommodification and stratification might work in sufficiently 
similar  ways  across  countries  to  enable  us  to  talk  of  distinct  regimes,  it  is 
nevertheless true that welfare states and systems of industrial relations have (to no 
small extent because of those very mechanisms) come to form inextricable parts 
of  national  identities.  As  a  consequence,  as  Davies  points  out,  pride  in  one's 
welfare model has to many Europeans become “the last  bastion of respectable 
nationalism” (2006: 34). 
Hence,  as  important  as  Sweden's  degree  of  empirical  ”fit”  in  different 
typologies  is  the  notion  of  the  Swedish  model  as  a  ”mobilizing  image”  of 
remarkable endurance (Ryner 2007: 64). Perhaps more so in Sweden than in any 
other country, welfare state expansion was from the beginning tightly linked to 
nation-building  as  a  highly deliberate  strategy by the SAP. The most  obvious 
example  is  probably the 1928 speech by party leader  Per Albin Hansson. His 
famous appeal to the Swedish citizenry to join in the social democratic vision of a 
“people's home” (folkhem) effectively wrangled nationalism out of the hands of 
the right and, in the ensuing decades, helped consolidate the SAP as the main 
exponent of public interest (Berman 2012: 245). Aylott makes a similar point in 
his  study  of  the  SAP and  European  integration.  The  main  reason  behind  the 
Euroscepticism  felt  by  many  Swedish  social  democrats  by  the  time  of  the 
referendum on membership, he argues, was not ideological in the sense that they 
opposed free trade or market integration. Rather, it was a distinct case of “welfare 
nationalism” (1999: 185). 
Popular support for the national welfare model remains extraordinarily strong 
(Svallfors 2011). This is of course to be expected given the theories of positive 
feedback and stratification described above. This in turn helps create the peculiar 
“logic of appropriateness” of Swedish politics, where even parties ideologically 
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opposed to  the current  system should find it  very hard to  explicitly  argue for 
radical change without paying the price at the ballot box. Whether certain parties 
are “really”  committed to the aspects of Swedish model  analysed here,  or just 
paying lip service, is of course both hard to conclude and outside the scope of this 
thesis. I would however argue that the SAP can be safely assumed to consider 
themselves supporters of the model they invested decades of political struggle to 
put into place. They would do so for both ideological and electoral, office-seeking 
reasons.
Robert Cox makes a relevant observation with regard to the “Scandinavian” 
model; that its most important function today might be its usefulness as a strategic 
tool to political actors. As he puts it: “one need only adjust the priority given to 
different values to create an interpretation of the model that would resolve the 
conflict with the changing policies” (2004: 207). But he also notes that these core 
values  (decommodification,  solidarity,  and universalism) do put  a  limit  on the 
amount of  conceptual stretching tolerated. It is paramount to once again state that 
the cases analysed below are chosen on these merits: that they are identified in the 
literature  as  posing potential  systemic threats  to  the  Swedish model.  They are 
described by several authors as running counter to precisely those “core values” 
mentioned by Cox, or the basic underlying mechanisms of Esping-Andersen. 
Here I find Elmerud-Præstekær's and Baggesen Klitgaard's (2012) distinction 
between  “policy”  and  “institutional”  welfare  state  retrenchment  useful.  Most 
studies of retrenchment deal with the first kind, which refers to direct and highly 
visible  cutbacks  in  specific  schemes  or  services  (Ibid:  1089).  This  gives  the 
researcher  the  opportunity  to  perform  quantitative  analyses  and  cross-country 
comparisons. Institutional retrenchment, on the other hand, is the term used for 
systemic,  less  visible  changes.  According  to  the  authors  these  can  involve 
transfers of authority between local and national levels of government, alterations 
to the balance between public and private  providers, or changes to the role of 
interest groups in policy making and/or implementation process (Ibid: 1098). The 
fact  that  such  developments  probably  only  have  longer-term  effects  (via  for 
example the mechanism of stratification) which are hard to gauge by the average 
voter, they are not generally assumed to cause political mobilization. This is the 
central argument made by proponents of the “new politics” theory. According to 
Paul Pierson and other scholars working in this influential tradition, retrenchment 
is  unlikely  if  it  produces  clear,  highly  visible  losers  which  are  sufficiently 
organized to punish politicians electorally (Starke 2006: 105-106). This is clearly 
not the case for institutional retrenchment.
Returning to the concept of misfit, it thus seems as if pressure to engage in 
institutional  retrenchment  should  pose  a  rather  tricky  problem  for  social 
democrats. If the SAP is a rational actor, the party should be expected to fiercely 
oppose the changes at hand, since they undoubtedly constitute profound misfits in 
relation to the Swedish model. Some theories of Europeanization proposes that 
such high levels of misfit has the consequence of changing national opportunity-
structures, making change more probable by giving voice to new actors (Börzel 
and  Risse  2000:  11).  If  exogenous  pressure  empowers  the  opponents  of  the 
Swedish model, the SAP should have ample reason to mobilize in its support. But 
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what if the SAP never conceives of these challenges as misfits? Certainly, those 
making the case for change in line with EU policies can be expected to argue that 
they in fact are compatible with the basic values and principles of the Swedish 
model.  But we cannot discern the possibility of political  actors themselves not 
fully  appreciating  the  scope  and  magnitude  of  some  forms  of  institutional 
retrenchment. Hence, a paradoxical scenario might arise where changes are too 
big and fundamental to be perceived as changes at all. 
4.2 Contributing factors
With the above observations in mind, I will now present the different factors that 
have been deemed relevant for the cases analysed in order to explain the SAP's 
actions.
4.2.1 Organized interests
As mentioned above, a central argument of the “new politics”-school is that 
the welfare state creates  (stratifies)  citizens  into client-  rather  than class-based 
coalitions  (consisting  of  beneficiaries  of  certain  schemes),  and  that  the 
mobilization of such groups help explain why welfare retrenchment generally is 
such a cumbersome endeavour.  But,  as  we have also seen,  one of  the central 
characteristics  of the social  democratic  regime is  that universalistic  policies  of 
high quality can counteract such tendencies. Anderson (2001) has sought to refine 
Pierson's  conclusions  that  partisan  politics  and  labour  mobilization  have  less 
explanatory power now than in the period of welfare state expansion. Her findings 
indicate  that  class  actors,  such  as  trade  unions  and  employers'  organizations, 
remain  the  relevant  actors  of  analysis  when  studying  welfare  retrenchment  in 
Sweden (Ibid:  1086).  This  is  something also emphasized  by Korpi  and Palme 
(2003:  442).  While  Pierson's  theory  assumed  a  liberal  welfare  state,  where 
benefits accrue to rather narrow groups who are easily identified and mobilized, 
the  Swedish  model  largely  rests  on principles  of  universalism.  Furthermore,  a 
substantial part of the financing is covered by employer's contributions. This gives 
them  an  incentive  to  engage  constructively  in  discussions  on  future  policy 
changes. It is also worth noting that unions in Sweden are still responsible for the 
administration  of  unemployment  insurance  (through  the  so  called  “Ghent-
model”), which to them remains a vital source of power (Anderson 2001: 1068). 
In  sum,  this  underlines  the  need  not  to  disregard  the  influence  of  the  social 
partners in Swedish politics. 
One might object that as the SAP are not in government for most of the period 
studied, corporatist arrangements should matter less. But we must also take into 
account the very strong affinity that still exists between the SAP and the Swedish 
Trade  Union  Confederation  (LO).  Even  though  collective  (automatic) 
membership  in  the  SAP  for  LO  members  was  abolished  in  the  late  80's, 
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institutional ties remain largely intact,  especially at the local level (Haugsgjerd 
Allern, Aylott and Juul Christiansen 2007: 616). LO makes early donations to the 
SAP in the order of approximately 6 million SEK. This sum does not include 
contributions to election campaigns (LO 2012a: 2). In recent policy papers, LO 
states that the organization is “committed to social democracy and opposed to the 
bourgeoisie  in accordance  with that  which forms the basis  for all  of the trade 
union movement's activities; power over the working life and over the distribution 
of the results of production” (Ibid: 8, author's translation). And as we have seen 
above,  even  if  Swedish  corporatism  today  suffers  from  an  overall  lack  of 
“agreement on overall aims and problem descriptions”, this has if anything led to 
closer  ideological  kinship  and  organizational  ties  between  the  SAP  and  LO 
(Lindvall and Sebring 2005: 1070, 1063).
Can we make more detailed predictions of for example union mobilization? 
Anderson observes that “encompassing” organizations such as LO might in some 
cases be more prone towards accepting retrenchment, if this is perceived as an 
necessary evil in order to preserve the system at large (2001: 1073). But as we are 
dealing  here  with  institutional  retrenchment,  such strategies  seem implausible. 
What could be assumed to impact, though, is whether the proposed policies result 
in  institutional  changes  that  diminishes  trade  union  power  and  influence 
(Elmerud-Præstekær's and Baggesen Klitgaard 2012: 1093). They should then be 
inclined to act politically, through the channels available, to resist retrenchment. 
And as Schumacher points out, LO in particular not only has a privileged position 
vis-à-vis the SAP, but also maintains the power to affect public opinion (2012: 
1038). There may of course also be other actors that may be similarly affected; we 
should not ex ante rule out the possibility of other forms of organized interests 
mobilizing and having an impact on the SAP's actions.
4.2.2 Other parties' positions
Besides  organized  interests,  the  actions  and  policy  preferences  of  other 
political parties should be presumed to play an important part. This is of course 
even more true when the SAP is not in office, as in most of the period covered by 
the cases. As the government represents Sweden's voice in the EU (or at least in 
the Council), they clearly hold a privileged position as regards agenda-setting and 
access  to  information.  It  is  also  the  case  that  the  opposition  parties  generally 
refrain from criticizing the government on EU-related matters. This is especially 
true when Sweden has held the Council  presidency.  Though there are  notable 
signs of EU politics becoming more partisan and contested, the need for broad 
parliamentary consensus still forms the overriding concern (Tallberg et al 2010: 
103).
Kitschelt argues that the policy retrenchment enacted by the SAP in the 80's 
and 90's  was possible  since disaffected voters  “certainly could not turn to  the 
more market-liberal bourgeois opposition parties and thus found themselves with 
limited alternatives to voice their satisfaction” (2001: 291). For similar reasons it 
is valuable to study the positions taken by parties close to the SAP on the political 
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spectrum. If these parties are perceived by voters as having a credible stance on 
welfare issues, social democratic parties should according to Kitschelt be more 
reluctant to propose retrenchment for fear of voter deflection (2001: 276). 
Welfare policy in general still holds as one of the SAP's strongest issue areas. 
It is the issue most commonly associated with the party, significantly more often 
than for any other Swedish party (Statistics Sweden 2011: 56). Furthermore, the 
SAP is by a large margin perceived by the voters as the party with the best welfare 
polices  (Ibid:  83).  But in other  respects the political  landscape in  Sweden has 
indeed changed, with the SAP suffering two consecutive election defeats to the 
centre-right coalition. It has been a widely reported fact that both these general 
elections (in 2006 and 2010) were fought primarily over employment – an issue 
up until  2006 firmly in the hands of the SAP, when it  was taken over by the 
Moderate party (Ibid: 59). This development has not been lost on the SAP. In 
recent years the party has come to increasingly emphasize employment issues in 
its campaigns and policy proposals, as made evident in for example the policy 
paper agreed upon at the 2013 Party Congress (SAP 2013). The point here is that 
issue-specific credibility is both a relative concept and something that changes 
over  time.  It  is  far  from self-evident  what  a  “credible”  welfare  policy agenda 
looks like, or how important it will be in the struggle for marginal voters come 
election day. This, and because of the uniqueness of EU politics in general, is why 
I am wary of applying Kitschelt's more detailed hypotheses to the cases studied 
below. Still some general points can be made bearing in mind the insights from 
discursive institutionalism. The SAP will have to relate not only to “objective” 
economic or institutional factors when formulating their responses to exogenous 
challenges. Equally, and in some cases even more important will be the ideas and 
discourses put forward by other political actors, as these influence the framing of 
an issue. The SAP can be expected to be more inclined to mobilize if an issue 
already has been politicized by another party and framed in a way that poses it as 
a challenge  to the Swedish model. If an issue on the other hand is handled by 
other parties as a matter of EU politics,  in the sense that it  constitutes foreign 
policy and thus requires cross-party consensus, this should make the SAP less 
prone to mount a staunch defence.
4.2.3 Financial vulnerability
Elmerud-Præstekær  and  Baggesen  Klitgaard  find  empirical  evidence  in 
support of their hypothesis that policy retrenchment is relatively more likely when 
the need for urgent budgetary improvements are greater (2012: 1093). Indeed, one 
of the most taken-for-granted assumptions of much of the literature on welfare 
retrenchment is that it is primarily driven by financial constraints; that we are now 
for  a  multitude  of  reasons  living  in  an  “age  of  austerity”  which  forces 
governments  to  cut  spending  in  one  way  or  another  (Pierson  2001:  82).  The 
presence  of  an  acute  economic  crisis  and/or  deteriorating  competitiveness  is 
similarly  identified  in  Europeanization  research  as  an  important  enabler  for 
change (Schmidt  2002: 896). The question of course becomes to which extent 
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such  pressures  can  be  assumed  to  influence  the  propensity  to  enact  also 
institutional  retrenchment.  As  noted,  such  changes  often  only  have  long  term 
effects. Acute budgetary concerns should thus not be assumed to be an important 
driving factor. Moreover, Sweden's public finances were widely regarded as being 
exceptionally  strong  during  the  period  covered.  Low public  debt  and  a  large 
accumulated  fiscal  surplus  allowed the government  to let  automatic  stabilizers 
play their part in full at the onset of the financial crisis of 2008 (OECD 2012: 25).  
There  was  no  perceived  pressure  to  impose  the  kind  of  excessive  austerity 
measures seen in many other EU countries, most notably in the eurozone. Thanks 
to this and an accommodating monetary policy, Sweden's economic recovery has 
been strong from a public finances perspective (Ibid).
What could influence the SAP's actions, though, are concerns regarding the 
more long term economic sustainability of either the welfare system in general or 
specific  schemes/services.  A strong current  position  must  not rule  out  worries 
about the future. During the 90's crisis, the SAP proved to be no stranger to rather 
severe  policy  retrenchment  (Berg  and  O  Erlingsson  2008:  77),  as  well  as 
institutional retrenchment regarding for example the pension system. In the latter 
case long term financial sustainability was a clear concern for both the SAP and 
LO (Anderson 2001: 1078). With regard to the impact of European integration, 
fears  of  “welfare  tourists”  and spiralling  costs  could  lead  the  SAP to  oppose 
deregulation (Ferrera 2005: 220). As would the threat of a “race to the bottom” 
caused by regulatory competition and mutual recognition for service providers (K. 
Schmidt 2009: 852).
4.2.4 Changing preferences among citizens
Since the SAP is intimately linked to the Swedish model, public discontent 
with the quality of welfare services is likely to have an negative impact on the 
party's electoral support. Quality is of course largely determined by the financial 
factors  discussed  above.  But,  as  Rothstein  (2006)  points  out,  the  overall 
legitimacy  of  the  system  is  also  a  matter  of  how  services  and  schemes  are 
implemented and organized. Not least following the so called “Study of Power 
and   Democracy  in  Sweden”  (Maktutredningen),  a  comprehensive  committee 
inquiry which was initiated in 1985 and published its official report in 1990 (SOU 
1990:44, Demokrati och makt i Sverige), there was a growing concern within the 
SAP  that  fundamental  reform  of  the  welfare  model  was  necessary  to 
accommodate citizen's  changing preferences (Baggesen Klitgard 2007: 184).  If 
the system was seen as rigid, overly bureaucratic, and insufficiently attentive to 
the  increasingly  heterogeneous  preferences  of  the  citizenry,  the  cross-class 
coalition between the working and middle classes might become endangered. In 
order to keep the middle class on board, choice and differentiation in some form 
would have to be introduced.
Such reforms would clearly constitute a form of institutional change, albeit not 
necessarily retrenchment. There is nothing inherently anti-social democratic about 
accommodating  citizen's  demands  for  a  certain  degree  of  differentiation. 
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Returning to the discussion on the fundamental values or characteristics of the 
Swedish model, choice in welfare services should not be regarded as institutional 
retrenchment unless it breaks with the principles of universalism or equality. The 
precise  point  at  which  this  occurs  is  not  easy  to  pin  down.  Again,  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  research  done  on  the  Swedish  model  indicate  that 
retrenchment has been of the policy rather than the institutional kind. Recent ECJ 
rulings  and EU policies,  however,  risk leading to  such levels  of  diversity  and 
fragmentation,  primarily  through  the  introduction  of  competition  and  market 
principles,  that the stratifying mechanisms of the system would suffer (Davies 
2006: 52). The point here is that the SAP should,  bearing history in mind,  be 
presumed  to  be  a  rather  pragmatic  actor.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  party's 
interpretation of the challenges posed by the EU is influenced by these historical 
“lessons”,  leading  it  to  view  them  as  institutional  change rather  than 
retrenchment. If the party perceives these changes as necessary in order to satisfy 
citizens' preferences for increased choice, this should temper their resistance or 
abolish it altogether. 
4.3 Summary of factors
After  this  discussion  we  can  summarize  our  findings.  A  precondition  for 
resistance is that EU demands for institutional retrenchment are perceived of as 
constituting a misfit in relation to to the Swedish model. Misfit is seen as being 
determined by both material  and discursive factors.  Hence, whether a misfit  is 
identified or not is hypothesized to depend primarily on the following.
Chance of resistance increases when changes:
1. Are framed by other political parties as constituting a challenge to the Swedish 
model.
2. Result in institutional changes that diminishes trade union power and influence.
3. Are seen as posing a risk to the financial sustainability of the welfare state or to 
Sweden's economic performance/competitiveness in a wider sense.
Chance of resistance decreases when changes:
1. Are framed primarily as an issue of foreign policy, demanding national unity.
2. Are seen as a necessary response to citizens' increasing demand for choice.
3. Are seen as necessary to ensure the financial sustainability of the welfare state or 
Sweden's economic performance/competitiveness.
The factors outlined above represent those commonly cited as important in the 
existing literature on welfare state retrenchment and Europeanization. It excludes 
those variables which have been deemed either irrelevant or inapplicable for the 
cases analysed. One of the inherent features of case studies as such is that they are 
much better at assessing  if and  how a certain factor contributed to the outcome, 
than  at  describing  how  much it  contributed  (George  and  Bennett  2005:  25). 
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Furthermore, few of the theories outlined above provide testable hypotheses when 
adapted to the cases of this study, especially after being modified to better suit the 
task at hand. The study will hence not result in the definitive dismissal of any one 
theory  as  they  have  been  originally  described.  Rather,  the  explanation  of  the 
SAP's actions will be used to further theory development, leaving the door open to 
the possibility that more than one theory may have contributed to the outcome in 
each case, or even overdetermined it – either on its own or by interacting with 
others (Ibid: 217-218).  
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5 Empirical analysis
This chapter will provide an account of the SAP's actions in each of the cases 
studied, guided by the theoretical framework presented above. It will begin with a 
short explanation of some of the methodological considerations made regarding 
for example the choice of sources. Then follows the cases, beginning with the 
issue  of  healthcare  and  its  subjection  to  EU  economic  law,  followed  by  the 
controversies surrounding temporary service providers and posted workers.
 
5.1 Methodological considerations
In the following analysis, the SAP will to a large extent be dealt with as a unitary 
actor. Its policy preferences will hence be interpreted as those expressed by the 
party leadership. Partly this is of course a choice dictated by time constraints. But 
it is also a deliberate strategy born out of the observation that the SAP is generally 
regarded as a predominately hierarchical,  top-down organization.  Though often 
portrayed as a decentralized party, the actual possibilities for grass roots-influence 
are small. At party congresses, for example, debates are often lively. But it is very 
rare for motions introduced by the leadership to be defeated (Aylott 1999: 37). 
Both Aylott (1999) and Gustavsson (1998) stress in their respective studies the 
importance  of  the  leadership's  strategic  management  of  EU membership  issue 
ahead of the 1994 referendum.  In the referendum on EMU in 2003, a  similar 
strategy of “compartmentalization”, meaning efforts to isolate the question from 
everyday domestic  politics,  failed.  It is however important to distinguish these 
instances of direct democracy from other EU-related issues. In referendums, party 
members  can  be  assumed  to  feel  less  obliged  to  back  the  leadership,  partly 
because  of  said  strategy  of  compartmentalization.  Such  strategies  causes  the 
rebellion to be seen as less damaging to party unity (Aylott 2005: 563). Following 
the referendum on EMU the party stated explicitly its ambition to mainstream EU 
issues and treat them as “ordinary” politics. Still, the overall picture seems to be 
one of a select few members being very engaged in these issues, while the broad 
debate among grass roots has failed to materialize (Rosén 2009: 262). There are 
thus  good  reasons  for  focusing  primarily  on  the  party  leadership  (including 
spokespersons and high-ranking parliamentarians) when studying the SAP's EU 
policies  and  statements.  The  choices  of  material  have  been  guided  by  this 
observation.  It  consists  mainly of  official  party documents  and press  releases, 
parliamentary material such as protocols and legislative documents, and debate 
articles in large newspapers. Secondary media sources have also been used.
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The original “case” of this thesis is of course the Swedish Social Democratic 
Party,  the  SAP.  The purpose is  to  explain  the  party's  responses  to  exogenous 
challenges  to  the  Swedish  model.  Bearing  this,  and  the  writings  of  Scharpf, 
Ferrera, and others outlined above in mind, my ambition has been to provide as 
broad a picture of the phenomenon as possible.  Following Scharpf's analysis  I 
hence found it useful to include one case primarily associated with the welfare 
model  as  well  as  one  with  potential  implications  for  the  model  of  industrial 
relations.  As argued before these institutions constitute two interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing elements of the Swedish model.  Together they underwrite 
the  financial  viability  of  and  popular  support  for  the  model  through  the 
mechanisms of stratification and decommodification. 
5.2 European healthcare
Healthcare may well be viewed as the prime example of negative EU integration 
driven  primarily  by  ECJ  jurisprudence  (Greer  and  Rauscher  2011:  799).  As 
described above, the gradual deregulation of member states' healthcare systems 
gives rise to two separate movements. Firstly, it will encourage exit from national 
systems by citizens seeking care in other member states (Ferrera 2005: 130). This 
development is further encouraged by the codification of case law through the 
adoption of secondary law such as the Patient Mobility Directive (2011/24/EU). 
The desirability of a directive, with the purpose of clarifying a number of legal 
questions surrounding the free movement of patients, was in fact first brought up 
in the Council in 2005 by the Swedish SAP-government. The issue has a long 
history  in  the  EU,  as  already in  1971 regulation  1408/71 was  adopted  which 
concerned the portability of social security rights.
There are however good grounds for assuming that the outflow of patients 
from the Swedish healthcare system will be negligible. Travel costs, geographical 
distance, and perhaps most importantly language barriers are likely to discourage 
citizens  (Edwardsson 2007:  73).  Rather  it  is  the  second effect  which  has  the 
greater  disruptive  potential  on  the  Swedish  model.  As  discussed  above,  the 
subjection  of  healthcare  to  EU competition  law and free  movement  principles 
would severely challenge the state's ability to plan and regulate the sector, as new 
private providers would seek entry both on a permanent and temporary basis. In 
the longer-term perspective this would jeopardize the stratifying mechanisms of 
the Swedish model and erode middle-class support.
As  discussed  above  in  relation  to  changing  citizen  preferences,  Swedish 
welfare  services  have  to  varying  degrees  already been deregulated  as  well  as 
decentralized to allow for increased choice. There has also been a marked shift 
towards  steering  mechanisms  based  on  economic  incentives  and  New  Public 
Management  principles.  Most  of  these  processes  were  initiated  well  before 
Sweden became a member of the EU (Madell 2011: 115). The point here is that 
this partial marketization of public welfare services should be viewed as primarily 
driven by endogenous factors, and that it has been the result of conscious political 
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choices (albeit in response to structural changes). In contrast, negative European 
integration as conceptualized by Scharpf entails the abrupt dismantling of national 
regulations while at the same time taking away possibilities of restructuring, either 
at  the national  or at  the European level.  This is something altogether  different 
from  the  gradual  changes  within  the  existing  social  democratic  welfare  state 
which for example Rothstein (2006) point to as possible.
One aspect of the Lisbon Agenda was a renewed political commitment to the 
completion  of  the  Single  Market.  There  was  no  explicit  call  for  an  all-
encompassing  approach to  services,  which  had  up until  now been  allowed  to 
develop on a case-by-case basis, mainly through ECJ case law (de Witte 2007: 2). 
Nevertheless,  in  late  2000  the  Commission  presented  its  “Strategic  Paper  for 
Services” which in its annex mentioned the possibility of applying the principle of 
mutual  recognition  also  to  services  (Ibid:  3).  The draft  directive  (COM(2004) 
2/final  3)  presented  by commissioner  Bolkestein  in  2004 was met  with  fierce 
criticism  by  many  member  states,  among  them  Sweden.  The  perhaps  most 
controversial aspect was the sweeping introduction of mutual recognition as the 
default  mode  of  regulation  (K.  Schmidt  2011:  44).  As  regards  healthcare, 
opposition in both the Council and the European Parliament resulted in its explicit 
exclusion  from  the  Services  Directive  (2006/123/EC  art.  2  para.  2f).  Several 
authors have commented that these changes from the draft proposal changed little 
in substance. The member states' efforts to exclude welfare from free movement 
and competition law through secondary law does nothing to change the Court's 
interpretation of the Treaty (Edwardsson 2007: 27).  From this perspective,  the 
final Directive only resulted in less legal clarity (Davies 2006: 43). This unsettled 
tension was manifested by the ECJ ruling in the Watts case (C-372/04) in May 
2006. Here the Court stated that healthcare indeed was a service in accordance 
with article 49 TEU, that this fact was not affected by the organizational features 
of  a  particular  national  system,  and that  member  states  were  prohibited  from 
“introducing or maintaining unjustified restrictions on the exercise of that freedom 
[to provide services] in the healthcare sector” (Ibid: para 86, 90 and 92).
As  mentioned,  the  SAP  government  took  a  clear  stance  on  the  Services 
Directive from the beginning. SAP parliamentarians spoke out against the draft 
directive  in  rather  straightforward  fashion,  warning  that  it  constituted  a  clear 
threat to the Swedish model and accused the Swedish Moderate party of endorsing 
it (SAP 2004-04-10). Then minister for health Ylva Johansson said in November 
2005, ahead of the Council adoption of the revised Directive, that the subjection 
of  healthcare  to  free  movement  principles  would  result  in  a  system  where 
treatment was granted according to the ability to pay rather than by medical need 
(SAP 2005-11-04). But as the SAP lost office in the 2006 general elections, it fell 
upon  the  centre-right  coalition  government  led  by  prime  minister  Fredrik 
Reinfeldt  of the Moderate  party to  implement  the Directive.  This process was 
finalized in 2009 through the parliamentary adoption of a new law on services in 
the Single Market (Lag (2009:1079) om tjänster på den inre marknaden) alongside 
a number of changes to existing laws (Proposition 2008/09:187). 
The opposition parties (the SAP together with the Greens and the Left party) 
in a joint motion stated that the final Directive was the result from hard work by 
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unions and politicians,  who together  had “averted the excesses  of  the original 
Commission  proposal”.  They  did  not  make  any  further  references  to  the 
implications for the Swedish welfare model (Motion 2008/09:N19). A Left party 
parliamentarian,  in  the  debate  before  the  vote,  did  bring  up  a  statement  from 
minister for trade Ewa Björling, in which the minister had called for the future 
extension of the Directive to cover also healthcare. Björling had further stated that 
this  was  something  which  the  government  would  pursue  when  holding  the 
presidency  of  the  Council  in  the  second  half  of  2009  (SvD  2009-05-27).  A 
member of parliament from the Centre party endorsed the minister's ambitions but 
the matter was not further debated at the time (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:23).
It  did however  prompt  two written  questions  to  minister  Björling  by SAP 
parliamentarians  asking  for  further  clarification  regarding  the  government's 
position. To these Björling offered rather evasive answers, stating the merits of 
the  internal  market  in  more  general  terms  (Skriftlig  fråga  2009/10:823; 
Interpellation 2009/10:127). As the government did not succeed in its ambitions to 
extend the scope of  the directive  during the presidency,  the issue disappeared 
from the  political  agenda  for  a  couple  of  years.  This  was  until  ahead  of  the 
European Council meeting in March 2012 prime minister Reinfeldt, together with 
eleven other heads of government,  sent a joint letter  to Council  president Van 
Rompuy  and  Commission  president  Barroso.  The  letter  was  a  call  for  more 
growth-oriented efforts to get Europe out of the economic crisis. It emphasized 
the need to “act with urgency, nationally and at the European level, to remove the 
restrictions  that  hinder  access  and  competition  and  to  raise  standards  of 
implementation and enforcement to achieve mutual recognition across the single 
market” (“Joint letter to President Van Rompuy and President Barroso”, 2012-02-
20). The letter was debated ahead of the meeting and meet no objections from the 
SAP (EU-nämndens stenografiska uppteckningar 2011/12:25).
Alongside these explicitly EU-related events, national debates concerning the 
marketization of healthcare has at times forced the SAP to react. Soon after the 
2006 election the centre-right government proposed to abolish existing restrictions 
on  the  privatization  of  hospitals.  It  was  also  suggested  that  private  hospitals 
should no longer be obliged to rely exclusively on public funds to finance their 
operations,  but be able  to charge additional  fees  to some patients  (Proposition 
2006/07:52).  Ylva  Johansson,  now  acting  as  SAP  spokesperson  on  the  issue, 
claimed that the proposals constituted “a systemic shift” for Swedish healthcare 
(Riksdagens protokoll 2006/07:103). Similar arguments were put forward in the 
party's 2009 policy programme on healthcare. It described the difference between 
the SAP's policies and those of the bourgeois government as being rooted in deep 
ideological  differences.  The  government's  policies  would  make  it  harder  to 
maintain  equality  and high quality  in  public  systems,  which  risked leading  to 
deteriorating support and a system where “only those who can afford to pay for 
themselves will have access to the best care”. It was also stated that less regulated 
systems, such as the American, were more expensive (SAP 2009: 8). There was 
thus  no  lack  of  political  debate  or  ideological  differences  on  the  issue  of 
liberalization – but nor was there any efforts to link these developments to the EU, 
either to justify or to oppose the policies in question.
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There was also another, related issue which proved to be decidedly harder to 
deal with for the SAP: whether or not to allow for-profit private providers. Even 
though  the  issue  was  not  restricted  to  healthcare,  it  deserves  attention  as  it 
eventually came to involve questions of EU law. The matter was debated at the 
2009  Party  Congress.  Ahead  of  the  Congress  representatives  from  the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) wrote a debate article 
in Sweden's largest daily newspaper.  The central  argument  was that any move 
towards restricting profits would severely discourage private providers to compete 
in the sector, which in turn would lead to less cost containment and efficiency 
(DN 2009-10-29). While several motions were introduced at the Congress calling 
for an outright ban on profits, the party leadership managed to secure agreement 
on a more fuzzily worded proposal which neither side was particularly happy with 
(Fokus 2013-04-05). It stated that providers, through stricter regulation and higher 
quality requirements, would be forced to invest returns back into their operations 
(SAP 2009: 74). 
In 2011 and 2012 this unresolved conflict within the party was brought to the 
fore by a series of scandals of mistreatment at elderly care homes operated by 
private providers, whose owners at the same time had been able to extract large 
profits from their operations (DN 2012-02-28). The ensuing public debate was 
(and still is by the time of writing) intense and at times highly polarized. Ahead of 
the  2013  Party  Congress,  LO sought  to  push  the  SAP  into  adopting  a  more 
restrictive stance. The union presented a report arguing that all private providers 
of  welfare  services  should by default  have  to  register  as  a  particular  form of 
company,  subject to a non-profit principle  (LO 2013: 51). LO's proposal drew 
heavy  criticism  from  organized  business  interests.  Almega,  the  employer's 
organization representing the services sector, claimed it to be in violation of EU 
public procurement law. A dramatically worded debate article directed at the SAP 
leadership was publicized. It stated that it would not be possible to discriminate 
between different providers unless the party was willing to “turn back the clock” 
and make all welfare services public (DN 2013-02-05). This claim was refuted by 
LO. They responded that since welfare providers in most cases operated in the 
country on a permanent basis, they were subject to the freedom of establishment, 
which meant that “Swedish rules are fully applicable”. LO further warned against 
unnecessarily circumscribing national discretion by pre-empting the ECJ in the 
area (SvD 2013-02-05).
At the Party Congress a compromise was reached. It was stated that healthcare 
was to be “democratically governed and jointly funded”. The possibility to extract 
profits  was to  be “substantially  restricted” through tighter  regulation regarding 
“quality-related costs”. Defying the warnings of a potential clash with EU law, 
municipalities were decided to be given the ultimate say on whether they wanted 
to allow for-profit providers to apply for tenders or not (SAP 2013: 20). But apart 
from this intervention from employer's  organizations the debate was,  as in the 
earlier case of the government's liberalization proposals, overwhelmingly framed 
as a national issue, without references to the EU.
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5.3 Posted workers
The controversial Bolkestein draft directive for services was at the heart of this 
issue as well. As mentioned, the draft directive sought to introduce radical reform 
through a  wide  application  of  the  principle  of  mutual  recognition.  This  move 
seems to have been the result  of a rather  gross miscalculation of its  power to 
persuade on the Commission's side (de Witte 2007: 11). Both the member states 
and  the  European  Parliament  mounted  significant  opposition.  In  the  end,  this 
resulted in the rewriting of article 16 of the Directive. This would no longer be 
titled “Country of origin principle” and any further explicit  mentioning of this 
principle was deleted (COM(2004) 2/final 3). Instead, the negotiated text contains 
a  long list  of  measures  which  the  member  states  may  not impose.  Those  are 
followed by a enumeration of justifiable requirements,  which also includes the 
following:  “Nor  shall  that  Member  State  be  prevented  from  applying,  in 
accordance with Community law, its rules on employment conditions, including 
those laid down in collective agreements”  (2006/123/EC art.  16.3).  The SAP's 
minister  for  business  and industry,  Thomas  Östros,  hailed  the  agreement  as  a 
“great success” which allowed Sweden to keep its model for the labour market 
(DN 2006-05-29).
Several  academic  commentators  took a  different  view of  the  Directive.  K. 
Schmidt,  pointing  to  the  above  mentioned  article  16.3,  notes  that  the  list  of 
justifiable  derogations  therein  is  much  narrower  than  existing  case  law.  She 
summarizes the long legislative battle thus: “The paradoxical result was that the 
final  Directive,  rather  than  to  ameliorate  the  far-reaching  application  of  the 
principle  set  out in the draft  proposal,  actually went even further” (2011: 45). 
Davies echoes this view and claims that the Directive in fact does introduce the 
principle of mutual recognition, albeit implicitly: “The situation where competing 
service providers on a territory are subject to different legal regimes – that they 
essentially  bring  their  own legal  regime with them – becomes  the  usual  one” 
(2007: 8). 
Having secured guarantees that the Swedish model was safe from regulatory 
competition and attempts at social dumping, the ECJ's rulings in the Viking (C-
438/05) and Laval (C-341/05) cases in December 2007 seems to have surprised 
the SAP. Viking Line was a Finnish shipping company plying the route between 
Helsinki  and  Tallinn.  When  the  company  announced  to  the  Finnish  Seamen's 
Union (FSU) their intention to reflag one of their ships to let it sail under Estonian 
rather  than  Finnish  flag,  and  its  crew  thus  be  bound  by  Estonian  collective 
agreements,  the  FSU  notified  the  International  Transport  Worker's  Federation 
(ITF).  The ITF sent  a  letter  to  unions in  Estonia  urging them to refrain from 
entering into contract with Viking Line. The company took legal action and the 
case  was  eventually  referred  to  the  ECJ,  which  had  to  consider  whether  the 
actions threatened by the ITF constituted a restriction of Viking Line's freedom of 
establishment.  The  court  found  this  to  be  the  case.  The  restriction  could  be 
justified only if  “the jobs or conditions  of employment  of the FSU's members 
liable to be adversely affected by the reflagging of the  Rosella [the name of the 
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ship] are in fact jeopardised or under serious threat”, and if the actions taken were 
necessary and proportionate in order to hinder this (C-438/05 para. 84). 
In  Laval,  a  Latvian  construction  company  (Laval)  was  contracted  by  the 
Swedish municipality of Vaxholm to build a school. When in 2004 the Swedish 
building  and  public  works  trade  union (Byggnads)  tried  to  strike  a  collective 
agreement covering the Latvian workers posted by Laval, the company refused as 
it had already signed one with a Latvian union (C-341/05 para. 28). Byggnads 
subsequently  took  collective  action  and  together  with  other  unions  put  the 
building site under blockade (Ibid: para 34). Laval decided to take legal action, 
and the case was referred to the ECJ as it concerned the application of the Posted 
Workers Directive (PWD) (96/71/EC). The directive, agreed upon in 1996, was at 
the time considered a major feather in the cap for the European left (Dølvik and 
Visser  2009:  497).  It  was  commonly  believed  that  “its  primary  aim  was  to 
reinforce  the social  protection  of  workers  rather  than  to  facilitate  the  trade  in 
services” (de Witte 2007: 6). As the Swedish model prescribes that wages be set 
in  agreements  between  the  social  partners  and  without  state  interference,  the 
Swedish  law  implementing  the  PWD  did  not  include  specifications  about  an 
enforceable  minimum  wage.  Given  this  and  the  fact  that  Laval  already  were 
bound by a Latvian collective agreement, the ECJ was asked to rule on whether 
the collective action taken by Byggnads was lawful (C-341/05 para. 40).
The Court stated that Laval  had in fact been discriminated against.  As the 
posted workers were already subject to a collective agreement struck with Latvian 
unions, Byggnads was in no right to treat Laval “in the same way as national 
undertakings which have not concluded a collective agreement” (Ibid: para. 117). 
It  also came to the conclusion that  collective  action  taken in  order  to enforce 
wages or regulations which went beyond the “hard core” of worker's right enlisted 
in article 3(1) of the PWD constituted a restriction on Laval's freedom to provide 
services  (Ibid:  para  99).  Since  the  wages  demanded  by  Byggnads  could  not 
according to the Court be considered “minimum rates of pay”, they could not be 
enforced (Ibid: para 70). Given how the PWD was commonly seen as constituting 
a  floor of protection  for  posted workers  these rulings  were surprising to  most 
commentators.  Joerges  and  Rödl  questions  “whether  Sweden’s  delegates  had 
realised that the directive required quite a substantial modification of the Swedish 
system of  collective  labour  relations”  (2009:  17).  Höpner  and  Schäfer  argues 
further that Laval had the effect of partly reversing the compromise reached over 
the Services Directive. The Court had “effectively restored the country-of-origin 
principle for all regulations that go beyond those explicitly mentioned in Article 
3(1)” (2010: 354).  
Together with the cases of Rüffert (C-346/06) and Luxembourg (C-319/06) in 
2008, Viking and Laval sparked wide dissatisfaction among European unions and 
parties on the left. In Sweden the SAP requested a special parliamentary debate to 
be held on the 17th of December 2004, in the middle of Byggnads' blockade of 
Laval, challenging the newly formed centre-right coalition to defend the Swedish 
model. SAP parliamentarians accused the opposition parties of making statements 
in relation to the Laval conflict which were “deeply hostile towards unions, and 
hence  also  towards  wage-earners”  (Riksdagens  protokoll  2004/05:54).  While 
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members of the Moderate party tried to play down partisan differences on the 
issue, the Liberal party struck a less conciliatory note, claiming that LO and the 
SAP had “mobilized the hard core of the labour movement in order to crush a 
handful of low wage earners” whose “ambitions will be crushed and dreams of a 
better life broken to pieces” (Ibid). After the debate LO issued a statement saying 
that the Moderate party had “spoken with a forked tongue” and failed to provide 
any definitive answers (LO 2004-12-17). 
The  issue  of  posted  workers  and  foreign  service  providers  proceeded  in 
several  partially  separate  tracks.  Following  the  ruling  in  the  Laval  case  in 
December  2007,  the  centre-right  government  appointed  an  inquiry in  order  to 
clarify whether the Swedish law implementing the PWD ought to be changed. The 
inquiry was to present its conclusions in December 2008. A leading SAP member 
of the European Parliament concluded in a debate article that Laval “introduces a 
kind of country of origin principle” which had been rejected in the negotiations on 
the  Services  Directive  (Europaportalen  2007-12-19).  The  SAP  reacted  very 
critically  to  the  ruling  in  the  Rüffert  case  in  April  2008,  claiming  that  it 
demonstrated the need for concerted action at the EU level to protect the rights of 
workers (SAP 2008-04-03). In September SAP party leader Mona Sahlin leader 
posed  a  written  question  to  prime  minister  Reinfeldt,  urging  him to  back  an 
initiative from the European Parliament. This called for a “social protocol” to be 
introduced to balance the economic freedoms provided by the Treaty. Sahlin also 
asked Reinfeldt to seek a revision of the PWD (Interpellation 2008/09:19). The 
government responded that it would not push these issues, as it was unlikely that 
discussions  would  result  in  compromises  favourable  to  Sweden  (Riksdagens 
protokoll 2008/09:16). 
The idea of some sort of social protocol had been discussed in many member 
states for some time, but gained new momentum following Laval and Viking. It 
was  then  taken  up  by  the  European  Trade  Union  Congress  (ETUC)  and 
progressives in the European Parliament. In November 2008 time had come for 
the Swedish parliament to ratify the Lisbon Treaty, a decision requiring a three-
quarter majority and hence necessitating SAP support. LO had after intense debate 
decided to act for the ratification to be postponed until after the inquiry regarding 
the Laval ruling had presented its conclusions. The organization's leadership for 
its  part  supported  ratification.  There  was  also  deep  divisions  within  the  SAP 
parliamentary group, with some leading members  openly urging LO to take  a 
harder  stance against ratification  as this  would force the party to do the same 
(Arbetaren  2008-10-30).  Eventually  the  SAP  leadership  managed  to  get  its 
parliamentarians on board (Motion 2008/09:U1). In the debate preceding the vote 
the SAP argued that the Treaty did provide for some strengthening of workers' 
rights and the “social dimension” in general. Nevertheless the government was 
urged to work for the introduction of a social protocol as well as a revision of the 
PWD in the coming year (Riksdagens protokoll 2008/09:32). The Left party and 
the Greens voted against ratification.
In parallel with the heated conflict following Laval, the government presented 
its proposal for a law implementing the Services Directive. As mentioned earlier 
this  was  generally  welcomed  by  the  SAP.  But  the  proposal  also  contained 
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provisions  which  enraged  the  unions.  LO,  the  Swedish  Confederation  of 
Professional Employees (TCO), and the Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations (Saco) disapproved of the government's decision to remove existing 
rules forcing foreign providers to have a “competent representative” stationed in 
Sweden for unions to negotiate with (SvD 2009-11-4). The SAP together with the 
Left  party  and  the  Greens  tabled  a  motion  echoing  this  demand,  explicitly 
referring  to the  concerns expressed by the unions (Motion 2008/09:N19).  The 
government's proposition nevertheless won parliamentary approval.
When  the  conclusions  from the  inquiry  concerning  the  Laval  ruling  were 
presented both trade unions and the political opposition, not least the SAP, were 
critical  and claimed it  contained loopholes  for  foreign service providers  (SvD 
2008-12-12). LO and TCO gave a joint opinion to the consultation process. They 
claimed that the proposed legal changes, which came to be known as Lex Laval, 
would in fact violate both the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
International Labour Organization's (ILO) conventions (LO and TCO 2009: 7-9). 
During  the  debate  before  the  parliament's  adoption  of  the  proposal,  SAP 
parliamentarians accused the government of undermining the Swedish model by 
unduly limiting the right to collective action. Furthermore, the government was 
criticized  for  not  sufficiently  making  the  case  for  change  at  the  EU  level. 
Representatives from all four government parties in return claimed to protect the 
Swedish  model  and  that  the  proposal  only  entailed  marginal  adjustments  to 
Swedish law (Riksdagens protokoll 2009/10:82). In January 2009 the SAP once 
again urged the government  to discuss the PWD at  the next  Council  meeting. 
Minister for employment Sven-Otto Littorin answered that he was unwilling to do 
this, as the consequences of the Laval case could be adequately addressed at the 
national level (Riksdagens protokoll 2008/09:63). 
In the election campaign of 2010, the SAP ran on a joint platform together 
with the Left party and the Greens. It contained promises to scrap Lex Laval and 
work for  a  revision  of  the  PWD as  well  as  a  legally  binding  social  protocol 
(“Regeringsplattform  2011-2014”:  6).  As  the  centre-right  coalition  mustered 
enough support to remain in office and form a minority government, the red-green 
alliance broke up, but the SAP did not abandon these demands. As the economic 
crisis deepened and increasingly came to be perceived as a crisis of the eurozone, 
calls for Treaty revision in order to ameliorate some of the exposed shortcomings 
of the institutional set-up of the EU became commonplace. This in turn offered 
new and fertile grounds for both the SAP and LO to push their pet idea of a social  
protocol. Furthermore, the new parliamentary situation following the 2010 general 
election  gave  the  opposition  parties  considerable  leverage  vis-à-vis  the  now 
minority government. The opposition was far from united in most areas, with the 
far-right  Sweden Democrats  tending to  lend their  support  to  the  government's 
policies,  but  on  some  salient  issues  concerning  the  Swedish  model  common 
ground was to be found.
The widespread dissatisfaction in many member states and in the European 
Parliament following the ECJ rulings described above caused the Commission to 
take action. In 2012 it proposed two new legislative instruments. First was the so 
called Monti  II regulation (COM(2012) 130 final),  which sought to clarify the 
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relationship  between  the  fundamental  freedom  to  provide  services  and  the 
fundamental  right  to  collective  action.  The  second instrument  was  a  directive 
concerning the enforcement of the PWD (COM (2012) 131 final). It contained a 
long list  of  mechanisms  (inspections,  sanctions,  etc.)  aimed  at  ensuring  better 
protection for posted workers.  As some commentators have noted, it is unclear 
whether  Monti  II  would  have  had  any  substantive  impact  on  the  Court's 
interpretation  of  EU  primary  law  (Malmberg  and  Johansson  2012:  3).  The 
question  will  remain  a  hypothetical  one  fore  the  foreseeable  future,  as  the 
proposal  was  dropped  after  twelve  national  parliaments  had  ruled  it  was  in 
violation of the principle of subsidiarity (EUobserver 2012-09-12). In Sweden the 
political parties unanimously decided that the Commission had acted outside its 
competences  when  trying  to  regulate  national  systems  of  labour  relations 
(Arbetsmarknadsutskottets  utlåtande  2011/12:AU14).  Despite  this  seeming 
consensus among all Swedish parties, the SAP took great credit for having forced 
the Commission to drop Monti II. It was described as the result of a EU-wide 
social  democratic  coordination  effort  involving  “tight  contacts  with  other 
parliaments around Europe” (Arbetet 2012-05-25).
Eventually the opposition parties were able to come together and outvote the 
minority government on two central issues. The first concerned the long-standing 
dispute  over  Lex  Laval.  In  June  2011  the  joint  opposition,  commanding  a 
parliamentary  majority,  issued  a  notification  (tillkännagivande)  to  the 
government.  It  dictated  that  the  government  was  to  launch  a  new  inquiry 
regarding  Lex  Laval,  as  well  as  work  at  the  EU  level  to  revise  the  PWD 
(Arbetsmarknadsutskottets  betänkande  2010/11:AU10).  A  new  parliamentary 
inquiry,  containing  representatives  from all  political  parties,  was  launched  in 
2012. In 2013 the International Labour Organization (ILO), following a petition 
from LO and TCO, issued an expert opinion stating that Lex Laval violated the 
ILO's Convention 87. The right to collective action could not be restricted by a 
proportionality principle (LO 2013-02-27). The SAP restated its commitment to 
abolish Lex Laval at the Party Congress in 2013 (SAP 2013-04-07). The second 
issue was the old demand for a social protocol. The opposition parties managed to 
gather a majority in favour of ordering the government to demand that the EU 
adopts  a  legally  binding  social  protocol  in  connection  with  the  next  Treaty 
revision.  Its  purpose  would  be  to  make  clear  that  the  fundamental  rights  to 
collective action were not subordinate to the economic freedoms of the Treaty 
(Arbetsmarknadsutskottets  betänkande  2012/13:AU5).  The  government  parties 
called  the  idea  “naive”,  as  the  process  of  Treaty  change  risked  “putting  the 
Swedish model at stake” when consensus needed to be reached among 27 member 
states (SvD 2012-11-28).
The demand for a social protocol shows how the party had come to appreciate 
the need for changes not just to secondary law (the PWD), but to the Treaty itself. 
It is obvious that forces within LO had taken much inspiration from the academic 
debate on these issues, and the writings of Fritz W. Scharpf in particular. In late 
2010 one of LO:s legal advisors wrote a debate article calling on the government 
to use future debates on Treaty revision to push for a limit on the ECJ:s powers. 
The article outlined the asymmetry between positive and negative integration, as 
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well  as  the  structural  imbalances  of  the  EU  which  favoured  the  latter 
(Europaportalen 2010-12-14). In 2012, LO released a report titled “Democracy as 
an obstacle to the EU's free movement” (LO 2012b). The report draws heavily on 
Scharpf's  writings,  in  particular  the  2009  paper  “The  Double  Asymmetry  of 
European Integration Or: Why the EU Cannot be a Social Market Economy”. The 
authors draw similarly gloomy conclusions regarding the current path of European 
integration. It is stated that although a social protocol is necessary to ensure that 
workers'  rights are protected,  such an instrument  cannot by its  own repeal  the 
EU's underlying structural flaws; for this more fundamental changes are required 
(Ibid: 26).
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6 Discussion and summary
In this final chapter I will first briefly recapitulate on the purpose and theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. This will be followed by a discussion of the results from 
the cases analysed above. Finally, these results and the conclusions drawn from 
them will be put into context, discussing their contribution to previous research on 
the subject.
This study was prompted by an observation from Fritz W. Scharpf: that social 
democratic  politicians  in  “coordinated  market  economies”  were  acting  against 
their  own  interest  by  lending  their  support  to  the  current  path  of  European 
integration.  They were,  in  Scharpf's  memorable  words,  “deluding themselves”. 
Other  scholars  claimed  social  democrats  were  rather  deluding  their  voters,  by 
using the EU as a cover for their own shortcomings (Bailey 2005). The purpose of 
the thesis has been to unearth why the Swedish social democratic party, the SAP, 
has reacted to the challenges of negative integration the way it has. Two cases 
have been analysed in detail: the subjection of healthcare to EU competition law 
and the freedoms of service provision and establishment, and the issue of posted 
workers, following the ECJ's rulings in, in particular, the Laval and Viking cases. 
To which  extent  have  these  cases  been perceived by the  SAP as  “misfits”  in 
relation to the Swedish model? And which mediating factors have been influential 
in the process?
Since  Scharpf's  basic  argument  is  that  social  democratic  parties  have  not 
mounted a sufficiently staunch resistance, and thus failed to appreciate the gravity 
of  the  misfit  they  are  exposed  to,  this  assumption  has  guided  the  choice  of 
theoretical  framework  grounded  in  welfare  state  retrenchment  and 
Europeanization literature. In some respects these theories have proven fruitful. In 
hindsight, however, Scharpf's assertions might be seen as somewhat premature. 
The most obvious observation to be made from the cases above is that the SAP 
has both realised the threat of European integration and mobilized against it. This 
is the overall conclusion reached trough the application of the chosen theories. 
But there are also noticeable differences between the cases.    
I shall begin with those factors which have proven to possess less explanatory 
power for the cases studied. Economic vulnerability was not hypothesized to play 
a major role, for two reasons. Firstly, the fact that Sweden's public finances during 
the period studied were by most observers considered very solid, even in the face 
of  the  economic  crisis  wreaking  havoc  on  most  of  Europe.  Secondly,  as  the 
institutional  retrenchment at  stake here is assumed to have mostly longer-term 
effects, more immediate cost containment is generally better pursued (and more 
easily sold to the electorate) through policy retrenchment. But how about the long 
run,  then?  The  centre-right  government  has  persistently  argued  in  favour  of 
retrenchment by invoking arguments  of competitiveness  and growth.  This was 
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especially obvious in relation to its support for an extension of the scope of the 
Services  Directive.  Organized  interests,  for  example  in  the  form  of  the 
Confederation of Swedish Enterprises, have at times tried to push the debate on 
welfare services marketization in this direction – albeit not with reference to EU 
developments. The SAP has not justified support for retrenchment for economic 
reasons, either in healthcare or in the case of posted workers. In the latter case the 
opposite  can  be  said  to  have  occurred:  it  was  often  argued  that  Sweden's 
competitiveness was partly a product of its system of industrial relations, and that 
it had to be protected for this reason. And as for healthcare, the party pointed out 
that more deregulated systems were in fact less cost-effective.
To state that the positions taken by other parties has been important might 
seem like a trivial observation, given the government's privileged position as an 
agenda setter on EU issues. Sometimes, this has had the consequence of forcing 
the  SAP  to  react  to  government  proposals  rather  than  take  the  initiative 
themselves. But this has far from always been the case. Especially following the 
government  coalition's  loss  of  a  parliamentary  majority  in  2010,  the  SAP (in 
concert with the other opposition parties) has in several cases been able to take the 
driver's seat. The government has been forced to succumb to demands for a new 
inquiry  regarding  Lex  Laval  and  whether  Sweden  should  strive  for  a  social 
protocol.  These  victories  might  have  little  substantive  policy  impact  but  have 
nevertheless been widely reported in the media. This also shows how Swedish EU 
politics have to a lesser degree come to be viewed as foreign policy,  requiring 
cross-party unity, and more to resemble “ordinary” politics, subject to the same 
partisan  divides.  The  ratification  of  the  Lisbon  treaty  might  be  seen  as  an 
exemption to the rule, seemingly seen as too important by the SAP to “politicize” 
despite demands from LO grass roots to use the party's support as leverage vis-à-
vis the government. On many occasions the SAP has tabled joint motions together 
with the Left party and the Greens. The three parties also ran on a joint policy 
platform in the 2010 general election. But there has been no findings to suggest 
that the positions taken by the other two have had any discernible impact on the 
SAP on these issues; the party has pursued the same policies independently both 
before and after these events.
Has changing citizen preferences affected the SAP's actions? As noted, the 
need to accommodate citizens' demands for increased choice and differentiation in 
welfare services has been a concern of the SAP at least since the 80's. The party 
today supports choice and private providers within a system of tight regulation 
and  a  high  degree  of  public  planning.  But  the  prospect  of  having  healthcare 
included in the Services Directive, and thus subjected to free movement and EU 
competition  law,  clearly constituted  a  step too far.  With  this  threat  seemingly 
disarmed the SAP leadership continued to thread a fine line in the national debates 
related to the issue. The question of profit extraction for private providers was a 
thorny one,  often  pitting  ideologically  motivated  grass  roots  against  the  more 
pragmatic leadership. The ensuing compromise all the same disregarded warnings 
from business interests that its restrictions would be in violation of EU law.
The “new politics” strand of welfare state theorizing has held that class actors, 
such as trade unions and left parties, should play a less vital role in the process of 
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welfare state retrenchment than during its  expansionary phase.  This claim,  put 
forward by for example Pierson (2001), has been refuted by proponents of the 
“power-resources” theory (Korpi and Palme 2003). I argue that the cases studied 
above provide support for the theory outlined by Anderson (2001). Trade unions 
clearly continues  to constitute  a  major  factor  in  countries  with deep corporate 
roots, such as Sweden. Anderson noted that Swedish trade unions were able to 
mobilize effectively and avert threats to one of their institutional power sources, 
the  administration  of  unemployment  insurances.  The  ECJ's  restrictive 
interpretations of their right to collective action, and the possibility of enforcing a 
general  principle  of  mutual  recognition  for  temporary  service  provision, 
undoubtedly represents similarly serious challenges.
As suggested by for example Lindvall and Sebring (2005), ties between the 
“two legs” of the Swedish labour movement, the SAP and LO, seems to be as 
close as ever (at least at the leadership level). It was earlier described how case 
studies are better at determining if and how a specific factor can explain a certain 
result – for example, in the form of claims that a factor is sufficient or necessary 
for  the  outcome observed (George  and  Bennett  2005:  26).  I  argue  that  union 
mobilization in this case constitutes a sufficient condition for SAP resistance to 
exogenous  challenges.  Swedish  unions,  also  including  the  organizations  for 
professional employees TCO and Saco but LO in particular, have throughout the 
process been a decisive force. They have participated actively in the public debate 
as well as used their institutional channels of influence to feed into the legislative 
process. 
If  what  matters  here is  the  potential  of  retrenchment  geared at  one of  the 
unions'  institutional  power  bases,  as  suggested  by  Anderson,  the  differences 
between the cases might be partially explained by the lack of actors with similar 
stakes in the area of healthcare. It is indeed hard to envision just which actor in 
the Swedish context that would take on this role. The losses resulting from this 
type of institutional retrenchment are exceptionally diffuse and, admittedly, rather 
hard to fathom.  On the other  hand, the gains  from further  deregulation would 
accrue to both domestic and foreign private providers. The Swedish employers' 
organization for service providers, Almega, did intervene in the national debate on 
profit extraction arguing that the SAP's proposals would violate EU law. They 
have  also  continued  to  push  for  the  further  liberalization  of  welfare  services, 
including  the  inclusion  of  healthcare  into  the  Services  Directive  (Almega, 
“Välfärden – nästa  exportsuccé?”).  But  there is  no evidence  of this  having an 
influence on the SAP's policy or actions. Indeed, what the analysis indicates is 
that the party is yet to fully grasp the potential implications of ECJ case law in this 
area.
Having secured  a  watered-down Services  Directive  before  losing  office  in 
2006, the SAP seemed confident that the threat had passed. None of the ensuing 
national debates on closely related issues were conducted with reference to EU 
law. There was an apparent,  creeping suspicion of the centre-right government 
trying to extend scope of the directive,  something which was duly noticed and 
criticized. In contrast, numerous academic commentators have pointed out that the 
Services Directive in fact did very little to change the way the ECJ is expected to 
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rule when it comes to free movement, competition law, and healthcare as a service 
among  others.  Secondary  law  is  in  these  cases  unlikely  to  affect  the  Court's 
interpretation of primary law.
This  can  be  compared  to  case  number  two,  in  which  LO  issued  reports 
drawing  heavily  on  Scharpf's  writings,  and  the  SAP  throughout  the  process 
demanded Treaty change and a social protocol. Admittedly, especially the Laval 
ruling might be seen as posing a more direct threat to the Swedish model as it took 
place on Swedish soil, with Swedish workers enforcing the blockade. But I would 
argue that this somewhat misses the point. What lead the SAP to understand  the 
severity of the misfit,  and propose the policies  necessary to amend it,  was the 
heavy mobilization undertaken by LO and other national unions. In the absence of 
such organizations, whose institutional power bases are challenged by the changes 
at hand, it is hard to see what would give national politicians the incentive to look 
two,  three,  even  four  steps  ahead  in  order  to  work  out  what  the  potential 
consequences might be of a string of ECJ rulings.
One additional factor contributes to this. Central to Scharpf's argument is the 
emphasis on structure rather than ideas and actors. I find this line of reasoning 
highly persuasive and illuminating. But it is also easy to see how it might fit rather 
uncomfortably with how most party politicians like to view the policy process and 
their part in it. If ideology and political preferences have not really mattered to the 
path which the EU has taken for the last  decades, this  insight might be partly 
“blocked” by politicians being predisposed to view politics as a battle over ideas, 
not decision rules and judicial interpretations. This cognitive bias is not something 
which can be either proven or dismissed by the findings of this thesis. But as an 
contributing explanatory factor it would form an interesting topic of investigation 
for future studies. 
Also aside  from the  insights  drawn from the  application  of  the  theoretical 
framework,  some other  points  need to  be  made.  The first  is  the  role  of  pan-
European left mobilization. In neither of the cases studied was the SAP alone in 
their resistance. Opposition to the inclusion of healthcare in the Services Directive 
was fiercely resisted by trade unions and left politicians across the EU, both at the 
national  and transnational  levels.  The ECJ  rulings  in  cases  related  to  national 
systems  of  industrial  relations  sparked a  similar,  if  not  even greater,  wave of 
political  mobilization  in  a  large  number  of  member  states  as  well  as  in  the 
European Parliament and in the ETUC. As this aspect was not included among the 
initial  factors, no strong claims regarding its importance can be made. But the 
demands for a social protocol in its current form clearly emanated at the European 
level. The SAP explicitly referred to the proposals put forward in the European 
Parliament, and ETUC's proposal (ETUC 2009) probably had an indirect effect as 
it was supported by LO. 
As have been argued many times above, there is much merit to the approach 
of studying the welfare state and the national  system of industrial  relations  as 
interdependent institutions. Is is especially fruitful, even necessary, in countries 
such as Sweden, where the social partners have been entrusted with much power 
and influence over a wide range of areas. Still, this collapsing of policy areas is 
not  without  its  complications.  Though  most  of  the  challenges  identified  by 
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Scharpf and other scholars can be described in terms of institutional retrenchment, 
the results from the above analysis indicates that different policy areas are subject 
to rather different  logics of mobilization and resistance.  This makes  it  hard to 
formulate any general theories to hypothesize on and explain the strategic choices 
of  actors,  even  when  dealing  only  with  a  specific  sub-class  such  as  social 
democratic parties. It was explained in a previous chapter that the modification of 
certain theories to fit the task at hand might render the results less generalizable 
and accumulative. But the conclusions from the study nevertheless contribute to 
previous research. Anderson's observations regarding the enduring importance of 
trade unions was perhaps the theory which required the least modification to be 
applicable, as it already can be said to deal with institutional retrenchment. This 
fact  makes  it  easier  to  directly  evaluate  its  explanatory  power  –  which,  as 
mentioned, is deemed to be substantial. Ferrera hence made a valuable point when 
stating that  “the new politics debate has tended at times to overstate its case, 
especially  as  regards  the loss  of explanatory potential  of traditional  variables” 
(2008: 99). 
As far as the cases studied go, the SAP is hardly deluding themselves. The 
party has identified the misfits at hand and acted accordingly. But in order to fully 
understand  the  underlying  mechanism  causing  the  misfit,  i.e.  the  structural 
asymmetry  of  European  integration,  and  propose  the  changes  necessary  to 
ameliorate  this,  the  party  needed  external  pressure  in  the  form  of  union 
mobilization.
6.1 Summary
The misfit  of between EU policies  and the Swedish model,  resulting from 
negative  integration  driven  primarily  by  ECJ  jurisprudence,  might  be 
conceptualized as institutional  retrenchment.  A sufficient condition for it  to be 
perceived as such by the SAP is that trade unions, and LO in particular, whose 
institutional power base is threatened by the developments at hand, mobilize to 
influence the party directly and/or through public opinion. The results support the 
claim that unions and employer's organizations, having been instrumental in the 
expansionary phase of the Swedish welfare state, remain the relevant actors also 
in  cases  of  retrenchment.  In  both  cases  the SAP can be  said to  have resisted 
institutional retrenchment and identified a misfit. The issues were politicized and 
used to criticise the centre-right government. But it was only when subjected to 
union pressure that the party was able to drew the necessary policy conclusions, 
and propose changes not only to secondary EU law, but to the Treaty as well.  
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